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Abstract
This thesis explores the economic consequences of violent conflict in two
African countries: Sierra Leone and Nigeria. The first chapter establishes that
civil war in Sierra Leone has important local economic effects. Almost twenty
years after the end of the war, greater conflict intensity in a chiefdom leads to a
higher share of agricultural workers, fewer educated workers and lower income.
In order to explicitly account for general equilibrium effects such as selective
migration in response to the war, the second chapter develops an economic ge-
ography model. The model sheds light on different mechanisms through which
conflict affects aggregate income: Changes in education, firm productivity and
individual productivity have both direct effects on income and indirect effects by
changing the allocation of labor across sectors and locations. Changes in ameni-
ties also affect the spatial allocation of labor. I leverage the structure of the
model along with observed income information and migration flows to identify
firm productivities, amenities and average individual productivities. The model is
used to perform counterfactual simulations. Aggregate income in Sierra Leone is
estimated to be 32% lower today as a result of the civil war. Importantly, despite
having received little attention in conflict research so far, firm productivity losses
can explain most of the decrease. Selective migration in response to the war also
seems to play an important role and implies that local reduced-form effects are
misleading when trying to estimate aggregate effects.
The third chapter exploits a peace policy that the Nigerian government im-
plemented in the Niger Delta region in 2009 to evaluate the effects of conflict
reduction. I construct a synthetic control region from the states that are not
part of the Niger Delta region and therefore unaffected by the policy as a within-
country counterfactual to the Niger Delta region. I find that peace following
the policy increased household expenditures by 19% four years later. Uncovering
potential mechanisms behind this economic upturn, I find an increase in self-
employment income by 67% and in education by 0.5 years of schooling. In line
with the findings from Sierra Leone, these results highlight the important link
between conflict and business activity.
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Pax Europaea – the period of relative peace in Europe since World War II – is
considered one of the most fundamental drivers of economic prosperity on the
continent for the last 70 years or so. By contrast, many countries in the world
have experienced periods of war and civil conflict since the second half of the 20th
century began. While the world has made enormous progress in reducing extreme
poverty in the last few decades, the lack of a downward trend in global conflict is
particularly concerning. Figure 1.1 displays the total number of conflict fatalities
over the last three decades. With the exception of two peaks in the mid-1990s
(Rwandan genocide) and more recently in 2014 (Syrian civil war), the global
death toll has stayed fairly constant in this time period. As almost a million
people have died in violent conflict in the last decade alone, it remains one of the
largest global challenges.
What is more, extreme poverty is increasingly concentrated in countries af-
fected by conflict. By 2030, two third of the world’s extreme poor are projected to
live in fragile and conflict-affected situations (World Bank, 2020). While studying
the causes and consequences of conflict has become a major field of inquiry within
economics over the last few decades,1 there is still a major gap in our understand-
ing of the impact of war on the economy in two dimensions. First, while a growing
literature documents the economic impact of conflict on affected places, we have
little evidence on the aggregate consequences in the long run. Investigating the
aggregate impact on an economy requires taking into account general equilibrium
effects. By its very nature, within-country analyses that compares more and less
1Blattman & Miguel (2010) provide an excellent review of the literature.
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Figure 1.1: Global Conflict
Note – Data based on the UCDP GED version 20.1 that covers 1989-2019
(Pettersson & Öberg, 2020).
conflict affected places fail to account for such effects. Second, analyses that
investigate mechanisms of how conflict affects livelihoods have largely focused
on the human capital channel. In particular, structural labor market and firm
activity effects have received little attention. This is not surprising given how
commonly education and health outcomes are observed in surveys while there is
often a lack of data on firms.
This thesis makes advances on both fronts, making use of the 1991-2001 civil
war in Sierra Leone and more recent regional conflict in Nigeria as case studies. I
make three core contributions. First, I develop and estimate a general equilibrium
model of the Sierra Leonean economy and the impact of conflict on it in chapter
3. A counterfactual simulation of the economy without war allows me to estimate
the aggregate impact of conflict since the simulation takes account of both direct
effects of conflict on places where it took place and general equilibrium changes.
The analysis finds that aggregate income today is 32% lower as a result of the
civil war that ended about twenty years ago.
Second, this thesis explores mechanisms that have received little attention
so far but turn out to be of major importance both in Sierra Leone and Nige-
ria. Chapter 2 shows that the sector of employment changes significantly with
increased conflict in Sierra Leone. Workers are much more likely to work in agri-
culture in locations that are more heavily affected by the civil war. This motivates
11
including firm productivities in each sector in the model developed in chapter 3.
Although not directly observed in the data, these parameters can be estimated
using the structure of the model and income information. Indeed, I find that a
loss in non-agricultural firm productivity is the most important driver of changes
in the economy-wide sector composition of workers and the aggregate income re-
duction. They almost entirely drive the employment sector result and account for
more than half of the aggregate income loss. While most papers have focused on
human capital effects as a channel of how conflict affects the economy, they only
play a limited role for changes in the sector composition and aggregate income in
Sierra Leone. The analysis of the benefits of peace in Nigeria in chapter 4 yields
similar findings. Household expenditures increase by 19% and a revitalization of
business activity seems to be a key driver behind this improvement in livelihoods.
In particular, self-employment income increases by 67%.
The third contribution is methodological. Chapter 3 introduces general equi-
librium modelling to the study of conflict. To the best of my knowledge, it is the
first piece of analysis that develops and estimates a general equilibrium model to
understand the aggregate consequences of civil war. The model also allows for the
estimation of mechanisms that are not directly observed in the data. Going be-
yond Sierra Leone, such a structure may find application in other contexts where
conflict has been studied to analyse aggregate effects and unobserved mechanisms.
Indeed, the large majority of papers that study the consequences of conflict has
been reduced-form in nature and exploited within-country variation in conflict
intensity, typically in difference-in-differences or instrumental variable identifica-
tion strategies, to estimate local effects of conflict. While Abadie & Gardeazabal
(2003) have introduced the synthetic control method, this has only been used to
estimate effects of conflict on overall economic performance so far. Chapter 4
expands its application to the study of two important drivers of a conflict impact
on the economy: education and self-employment income.
This thesis is organized in three chapters. Chapter 2 and 3 shed light on
the long-run consequences of the 1991-2001 civil war in Sierra Leone. Chapter 2
provides estimates of the local impact of conflict on affected places and sets the
stage for the general equilibrium analysis in chapter 3. Chapter 4 turns to Nigeria
and exploits a peace policy that was implemented by the Nigerian government in
the Niger Delta region in 2009 to estimate the effects of conflict reduction.
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Chapter 2
The Legacy of Conflict: Local Effect
Estimates from Sierra Leone
2.1 Introduction
This chapter is a reduced-form analysis of the long-run local effects of civil war
in Sierra Leone. The analysis shows that conflict alters the economy in major
ways and motivates key elements of the general equilibrium model I develop and
estimate in the next chapter. Drawing mainly on household survey data from
2018, I observe workers’ income, sector choice and education in Sierra Leone.
I measure conflict intensity as the average victimization households experience
within a chiefdom, the lowest level of government in the country.1
Since conflict is not randomly placed I use distance to the Liberian border as
an instrument. This is motivated by the fact that Liberian rebels were heavily
involved in the Sierra Leonean civil war, in particular in the beginning. In fact,
Liberia experienced a civil war that started just a few years earlier. As a result of
Liberian involvement, distance to the border strongly predicts conflict intensity.
At the same time, chiefdoms close to and far from the border within small districts
can plausibly be assumed to be comparable before the war. A number of checks
lends credibility to this assumption. First, trade with Liberia only played a
negligible role before the war. Second, distance to the Liberian border is largely
uncorrelated with a range of pre-war observable chiefdom characteristics. Third,
geographic characteristics that matter for economic outcomes and could vary
1There are 159 chiefdoms in the country of which sufficient information is observed in 151
that are used in the analysis.
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with distance to the border are held constant in the analysis. These include
distance to a major urban center as well as properties of the land such as slope,
texture and drainage. Fourth, a placebo test on education effects for people above
school age when the war started yields a zero result which speaks in favor of the
instrument’s orthogonality with pre-war outcomes. Therefore, the instrument
creates exogenous variation of conflict within districts that can be exploited to
identify the local effect of civil war.
A key result emerging from the reduced-form analysis is that workers living in
chiefdoms hit by conflict experience substantial income losses, even twenty years
after the end of the war. Moving from chiefdoms with relatively low conflict
intensity (at the 25th percentile of the conflict distribution) to chiefdoms with
relatively high conflict intensity (at the 75th percentile of the conflict distribu-
tion) leads to a drop in income by 38%. A look at the sector allocation of workers
reveals an important driver behind this income loss: reverse structural transfor-
mation. Workers are 23 percentage points more likely to work in the lower paying
agricultural sector in chiefdoms that experience high conflict intensity relative to
those with low conflict intensity.
The education results are similarly strong. Moving from low to high conflict
intensity reduces the average education obtained by 1.2 years of schooling. To
the extent that human capital affects income, this directly contributes to the
income drop. At the same time, education obtained and sector choice are highly
correlated in Sierra Leone. Therefore, the education loss can also be a driver of
the sector shift observed.
The results are robust to three types of checks. First, including different sets
of controls does not significantly change the results. Second, outcome variables
can be measured in different ways with similar results. Third, the sample can
be restricted in various ways to check whether specific chiefdoms drive the re-
sults with potential implications for the empirical validity of the approach. For
example, if trade with Liberia posed a threat to the validity of the instrument,
we would expect to see different results when excluding chiefdoms that directly
border Liberia since trade effects are arguably particularly important for those
chiefdoms. However, the main results hold up to all sample restrictions carried
out.
The reduced-form analysis establishes important economic differences between
14
more and less affected chiefdoms, even almost twenty years after the end of the
war. Even though the estimates, in particular on income, represent large effects,
they are broadly in line with other studies that have considered the relationship
between conflict and economic performance (e.g. Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2003;
Blattman & Annan, 2010; Serneels & Verpoorten, 2015). Yet, while the estimates
show that there is important economic divergence between more and less affected
areas by conflict, there are two important shortcomings of the results. First, these
income differences do not necessarily reflect aggregate income effects. In general
equilibrium, people move. Therefore, spatial income differences capture both the
direct effect of conflict and the reallocation of labor. Second, the analysis only
allows us to look at mechanisms that are actually observed in the data, such
as education. However, the magnitude of the income effect and the sector shift
observed are unlikely only to be due to the education loss observed. Both these
shortcomings are addressed in chapter 3 which develops a general equilibrium
model that accounts for more mechanisms than education and allows for the
estimation of aggregate effects.
The core contribution of this chapter is to set the stage for that analysis
and shed light on a channel of the impact of conflict that has received little
attention so far and motivates some key elements of the model developed in
chapter 3: reverse structural transformation. Only few studies consider firm or
sector allocation outcomes and these are typically short-run analyses (Bozzoli
et al., 2012; Camacho & Rodriguez, 2013; Collier & Duponchel, 2013). Yet, I
show that the link between conflict and the sector of employment in the long
run is very strong in Sierra Leone. By contrast, the literature on human capital
effects of conflicts is large.2 While this chapter also demonstrates evidence on
human capital losses, the other results suggest that the drivers and implications
of a sector shift as a result of the war deserve more exploration.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides a
brief overview of the Sierra Leonean civil war that motivates it as an empirical
setting. Section 2.3 discusses the empirical design of this study and section 2.4
presents reduced-form results. Finally, section 2.5 concludes.
2Focusing on civil war and long-run outcomes at least 10 years after the end of war, these
include Akbulut-Yuksel (2014); Akresh & De Walque (2011); Galdo (2013); La Mattina (2018);
Leon (2012); Saing & Kazianga (2020).
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2.2 The Civil War in Sierra Leone
Sierra Leone suffered an atrocious civil war between 1991 and 2002 that caused
some 70,000 casualties, displacement of roughly half the population and left many
people injured, maimed and raped (UNDP, 2006). While the war was extremely
brutal, the country has experienced a long period of sustained peace since it ended
in early 2002. This provides an ideal setting to investigate long-run effects of the
war today.
The civil war started as an insurgency by the Revolutionary United Front
(RUF) under Foday Sankoh in 1991 entering the country from Liberia in the
southeastern part of the country.3 The RUF was a small rebel group at the onset
of war with the political goal of overthrowing the ruling one-party regime, led by
the All People’s Congress (APC) party under Joseph Saidu Momoh (Richards,
1996). Their insurgency was supported by the National Patriotic Front for Liberia
(NPFL) led by Charles Taylor and involved in the ongoing Liberian civil war. In
fact, the RUF had started their fighting activities in Liberia along with the NPFL
when the war broke out in the neighboring country in 1989. Foday Sankoh and
Charles Taylor had met each other and worked and trained together before. The
RUF remained mainly active and the fighting concentrated in the southern parts
of Sierra Leone bordering Liberia between 1991 and 1995 until it eventually spread
to other parts of the country. This involvement with Liberia means that distance
to the Liberian border is highly predictive of conflict intensity and motivates its
use as an instrumental variable.
As Richards (1996) argues, political grievances played an important role as
a cause of the civil war. In particular young people were discontent with a
patrimonial system in which a small group of patrons rules and decides on the
allocation of opportunities and transfers arbitrarily. They felt disenfranchised and
robbed of education and other opportunities. The RUF’s ideological roots lied
in an idea of egalitarianism which initially helped in recruiting disenfranchised
youth. However, as knowledge of the atrocities committed by the group spread,
recruitment by capture became more necessary and common.
One of the atrocious features of the Sierra Leonean civil war was the extreme
degree of violence against civilians, in particular all the community looting opera-
3Figure B1 displays the location of Sierra Leone and Liberia in West Africa.
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tions as well as the raping, killing and maiming that characterized the war. Quite
tellingly, such operations were called “Operation Pay Yourself” or “Operation No
Living Thing”. These acts of violence were not only committed by the RUF, but
also by the Sierra Leonean Army (SLA) throughout the war, often by so-called
“Sobels” who were soldiers by day and rebels by night, taking on an identity under
which it was more legitimate and less consequential to engage in these activities.
With such violent activities characterizing how households were affected by the
war, Sierra Leone provides a unique data environment for the study of conflict.
The Sierra Leonean Integrated Household Survey 2011 contains direct informa-
tion on how households were victimized as a result of the war. This information
can be used as a measure for conflict intensity that captures the effect of the civil
war well.
The opportunistic behavior of fighters demonstrates that there was an element
of “greed” to the civil war that also became increasingly prevalent in the illicit
mining or smuggling of diamonds.4 The diamond wealth resulting from these
activities helped funding the war and provided incentives to prolong it (Keen,
2005; Richards, 2004). Therefore, throughout the war, economic motives became
increasingly important in the rebels’ decision to engage in fighting.
Another interesting feature is the lack of ethnic or religious divisions as a key
driver of war, as Bellows & Miguel (2009) point out. No ethnic group appeared to
be disproportionately victimized and there seems to be no evidence that violence
against a particular civil community was more pronounced if the community and
the fighting group have largely differing ethnicity.
2.3 Empirical Design
2.3.1 Data
The main source of data for this study is the Sierra Leonean Integrated House-
hold Survey (IHS) 2011 and 2018 which are general representative individual-level
surveys. I use detailed questions on economic activity in 2018 to construct the
following outcome variables. First, as a proxy for worker income, I use house-
4The literature on the causes of consequences broadly distinguishes between economic op-
portunism and political grievances – coined the “greed” and “grievances” routes to conflict in
the seminal work by Collier & Hoeffler (2004).
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hold expenditure information on food and non-food items and divide this by the
number of working people in a household.5 The reason for using information on
expenditures rather than income directly is that the expenditure data is much
more complete and highly likely to be more reliable. It is recorded in weekly vis-
its by enumerators during which households indicate the items they bought and
at which price they did so. Such information is significantly easier to remember
than providing information on different income sources over the past year in a
setting where most workers are subsistence farmers or engage in small business
activities without any bookkeeping.
Second, the main sector that individuals work in is constructed according
to the ISIC classification (see Figure B2). For all main results, a simple binary
distinction between agriculture and non-agriculture (manufacturing and services)
is made.
Third, education outcomes are recorded directly. From information on com-
pleted grades, I use years of schooling and an indicator for having finished primary
education.
Regarding conflict data, the 2011 survey contains a section with a number of
questions on the impact of conflict on individuals and households that I make
use of. As a conflict measure, I follow Bellows & Miguel (2009) in constructing
a victimization index. This index is the share of “yes” answers to eight binary
questions in the survey that cover how households were affected by the war along
the following dimensions: (1) whether the household lost property or assets;
(2) whether the house was burnt; (3) whether household members were killed;
(4) whether relatives were killed; (5) whether household members lost limbs; (6)
whether household members were molested or raped; (7) whether household mem-
bers were displaced; (8) whether the war had any other effect on the household.6
Given that the extreme degree of violence against civilians was a feature of the
Sierra Leonean civil war, a victimization index seems to be a sensible measure of
the intensity of conflict.
For my analysis and in line with Bellows & Miguel (2009), I aggregate the
5The division by the number of workers is done to reflect worker income. However, all my
IV analyses can be performed on related measures such as total household expenditures or
expenditures per adult equivalent. All main findings go through in this robustness exercise as
demonstrated in section 2.4.2.
6Bellows & Miguel (2009) use very similar questions in a survey carried out by the Institu-
tional Reform and Capacity Building Project (IRCBP) to construct their victimization index.
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household-level victimization experience at the chiefdom level to construct conflict
measures at that level. For ease of interpretation, the measure is standardized.
With five chiefdoms missing in the household survey 2018 and three different
ones missing in the household survey 2011, I observe 150 chiefdoms in addition to
the capital Freetown in 2018. Chiefdoms are the lowest level of administration.
At the next higher level, Sierra Leone is administered in 14 districts, the level
of my fixed effects in the empirical analysis. The aggregation and subsequent
treatment of conflict at the chiefdom level serves to capture potentially large
within-chiefdom spillovers of conflict.
Furthermore, the 2018 survey contains detailed information on migration. In
particular, the chiefdom of birth as well as the chiefdom of residence and the
year of moving are recorded for each individual. This information is crucial when
estimating the model. The estimation requires knowledge of both origin and
destination for all individuals.
In addition to socio-economic control variables from the IHS data, I use data
from Glennerster et al. (2013) for some land characteristics as controls and census
data from 1963, 1985 and 2015.7 I also use geographic information to compute
the distance of a chiefdom centroid from the Liberian border which serves as an
instrumental variable in my analysis. In order to test whether this instrument
correlates with pre-war characteristics, I draw on census data as well as data
used in Bellows & Miguel (2009) and Acemoglu et al. (2014). They provide
information on economic outcomes before the war, albeit partially incomplete,
including education and expenditure in 1989 as well as historic tax and trade
variables. Summary statistics for all variables used are provided in Table 2.1.
2.3.2 Identification Strategy
My main specification to estimate the effect of conflict on outcomes is an instru-
mental variable (IV) specification using the distance to the Liberian border as an
instrument for conflict. Given the interlinkages between the civil wars in Liberia
and Sierra Leone and the fact that fighting originated and concentrated in the
border area for a long time, distance to the Liberian border is strongly correlated
with conflict intensity. As Figure 2.1 depicts clearly, while fighting spread to most
7I only have aggregate information at the chiefdom level for the 1963 and 1985 census and
excerpts for the 2015 wave of the census.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
N Mean Std. Dev.
Individual Level
Female dummy 21407 0.54 0.50
Household size 21407 7.27 3.75
Age 21407 36.5 16.3
Religion is Christianity 21407 0.23 0.42
Religion is Islam 21407 0.76 0.42
Years of schooling 21396 5.19 5.44
Finished primary school 21397 0.47 0.50
Worker Level
Main sector is agriculture 14482 0.54 0.50
Main sector is manufacturing 14482 0.090 0.29
Main sector is services 14482 0.37 0.48
20 day expenditures per worker (in USD) 14355 60.3 61.9
Chiefdom Level
Conflict 163 0.21 1.01
Distance to border 166 114.9 80.0
Vector ruggedness measure, (3x3 window) 166 0.37 0.081
Average Elevation (km) 166 0.17 0.15
% of chiefdom w/ slope between 2-8% 166 58.5 14.8
% of chiefdom w/ slope between 8-30% 166 19.8 15.3
% of chiefdom w/ slope between 30-45% 166 3.31 5.04
School attendance 1989 76 0.28 0.20
School enrollment 1989 76 0.30 0.20
Log p.c. expend. 1989 76 7.94 0.68
Log pop. density 1985 159 3.79 0.78
19th Cen. trading route 154 20.0 19.7
Mining permission 1930 154 0.18 0.38
Hut Tax/Area 1900 89 0.94 1.42
Hut Tax/Pop. 1900 88 0.028 0.030
Population 1963 153 13712.0 9961.6
Note – The individual sample consists of all individuals in 2018 who were born before
the end of the war in 2001. The worker sample is restricted to the working population.
All monetary values are in 2018 USD and the top 1% is truncated.
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parts of the country throughout the war, the highest conflict levels are experi-
enced by areas bordering Liberia in the Southeast and in the corridor between
the border and the capital Freetown in the very West towards which the rebels
progressed.
Figure 2.1: Variation of the Victimization Index
Note – Standardized victimization index for all chiefdoms of Sierra
Leone. The south-eastern border on the map is the border with Liberia.
The blue dot in the western part of the country marks the capital Free-
town. Missing conflict information in three chiefdoms.
My IV-2SLS specification is characterized by the following equations:
yic = αdistrict + β ̂conflictc + Xic′µ+ εic (Second Stage) (2.1)
̂conflictc = α̂FSdistrict + γ̂FSdistancec + Xic′µ̂FS (First Stage) (2.2)
where yic is the outcome of interest for individual i in chiefdom c, distancec is the
instrument and αdistrict capture district-level fixed effects. The vector of controls
includes a set of socio-economic controls as well as characteristics of the land. Im-
portantly, in all specifications, I control for distance to one of the five largest cities
in Sierra Leone (Freetown, Bo, Kenema, Koidu, Makeni). These five cities are
well known as urban and regional economic centres and the only large cities of the
21
country with a population exceeding 100,000 inhabitants. Controlling for distance
to these cities ensures that any potential mechanical relationship between border
distance and distance to large cities does not act as a confounder. The underlying
reason for a potentially confounding relationship is that economic development
can have a highly geographic component. Growth in an area can subsequently
lead to economic development around that area (Felkner & Townsend, 2011).8
While different regions within Sierra Leone differ not only in their distance to
the Liberian border but also in terms of other characteristics that are correlated
with economic outcomes, performing the analysis within districts is crucial to
satisfy the exclusion restriction. The identification assumption is therefore that,
within districts and conditional on the set of control variables used, distance to the
Liberian border only affects outcomes after the war through inducing variation
in conflict, but not through any other channel.
One potential concern with this assumption is that distance to the Liberian
border is naturally related to trade. Even within the same district, chiefdoms
that are located closer to the border may have been more active in trading before
the war and therefore at a different level of economic development. This would
lead to a violation of the identification assumption. However, I argue that such
a violation is unlikely to play a major role for three reasons.
First, trade with Liberia is only of negligible size relative to the total trade
volumes of Sierra Leone before the war. Exports to Liberia as a share of to-
tal exports are less than 0.1% before the war.9 The main trading partners of
Sierra Leone are Europe and the US and trade with these partners would not go
through Sierra Leone but rather through their main port in Freetown. Distance to
Freetown as one of the major urban centres is controlled for in all specifications.
Second, I provide a test against the hypothesis of trade as a major confounder
by excluding chiefdoms directly bordering Liberia and repeating my main IV
analysis on worker income as an outcome. To the extent that chiefdoms with a
direct border would especially benefit from trade, this should lead to results that
8In addition, the full set of controls contains the following variables. Socio-economic con-
trols are household head’s sex, age, age squared, religion as well as household size. The land
characteristics are a vector ruggedness measure, the average elevation in a chiefdom, the share
of chiefdom terrain with slope between 2-8%, 8-30% and 30-45%, the share of chiefdom terrain
with coarse texture and with medium texture, as well as the share of chiefdom soil with poor
drainage and with excessive drainage.
9Information from the UN Comtrade Database (accessed in October 2020 under
https://comtrade.un.org/). The most recent year with information on trade in Sierra Leone
before the war started is 1986.
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differ from the main results on the full sample. However, the results with the
restricted sample are very comparable to the main results.
Third, districts are small. Sierra Leone as a whole country is as large in area
as the Netherlands and Belgium together and subdivided into 13 rural districts,
excluding Freetown. The average rural district’s area is therefore only 5000 square
kilometers. While location likely matters for trade at the country level, it is
implausible that it would play an important role within these small districts.
Another concern pertaining in particular to the sector allocation as an out-
come of interest may be differences in the quality of the land that are related
to the border distance. This is the main reason behind including a variety of
land characteristics as a set of control variables in the analysis. In fact, the in-
clusion of these controls leads to stronger IV results. Therefore, choosing the
sparser and more precisely estimated specification without land controls as my
preferred specification is a conservative approach which means that the results
can be interpreted as a lower bound on the true effect.
Further to these considerations, I also use pre-war characteristics drawing on
data used in Bellows & Miguel (2009) and Acemoglu et al. (2014) to test whether
distance to the Liberian border has predictive power for economic outcomes before
the war within districts. The results are shown in Table 2.2. Distance to the
border within districts has no significant predictive power (at the conventional 5%
level) for any outcome. In fact, only one outcome has a significant coefficient at
the 10% level which can easily arise by chance when testing nine outcomes. Given
these results on observable variables, it seems very unlikely that the instrument
is related to post-war outcomes through other unobservable channels.
Considering the first stage, results of a formal test are shown in Table 2.3.10
I include Kleibergen-Paap F statistics that allow for the cluster structure of my
error term and are still comfortably above the conventional threshold of 10.11 In
addition to these F statistics, I follow Andrews et al. (2019) and report weak-IV
robust p-values based on the Anderson-Rubin statistic. For all main results, they
are close to the classic p-values and do not change conclusions about inference.
For the analysis of education outcomes, the fact that education is usually
10Figure B3 graphically displays the correlation between my standardized conflict measure
and distance to the Liberian border within districts.
11Note that Kleibergen-Paap F statistics are equivalent to Montiel-Pflueger F statistics in



















































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.3: First Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Conflict Conflict Conflict Conflict
Distance to border (km) -0.0128∗∗∗ -0.0114∗∗∗ -0.0120∗∗∗ -0.0104∗∗∗
(0.00264) (0.00292) (0.00272) (0.00292)
Sample Individuals Individuals Workers Workers
N 21407 21407 14482 14482
R2 0.738 0.748 0.714 0.728
F (KP) 23.59 15.34 19.47 12.67
Socio-econ. Controls X X X X
Land Controls X X
District FE X X X X
Note – Clustered standard errors at the chiefdom level in parentheses. Kleibergen-Paap
cluster-robust F statistic reported. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
obtained during a particular age provides me with additional cohort variation
that I can exploit for a placebo test of the identification assumption. I split the
sample and run the IV analysis separately for people who were at school age
when the war started and those who were already old enough to have finished
their education. I use a generous definition of school age with age 30 at the
beginning of the war as a cut-off point.12 If the instruments does not satisfy the
exclusion restriction in a way that is relevant for education as an outcome, this
should become visible in the analysis of the old cohort. I show that conflict only
affects people at school age but there is no effect for the old cohort. This lends
further support to the exogeneity of the instrument.
2.4 Reduced-form Results
2.4.1 Main Results
Table 2.4 demonstrates the results of an OLS regression and the IV specification
for worker income, as proxied for by expenditures per worker, for different sets of
control variables. The effect of conflict is large. Based on the more parsimonious
specification in column (3), an additional standard variation of conflict intensity
reduces income by 30% twenty years after the end of the war. This means that
workers living in chiefdoms that are at the 75th percentile of the conflict distri-
bution (high conflict intensity) have 38% lower income than households living in
12The results are robust to using different cut-off points, for example anyone aged 18 or older
at the beginning of the war.
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chiefdoms at the 25th percentile of the conflict distribution (low conflict intensity).
The results suggest substantially lower livelihoods in more affected chiefdoms as
a result of the war.
Table 2.4: Expenditures per Worker
Log household expenditures per worker
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Conflict -0.0674∗ -0.0797∗∗ -0.306∗∗ -0.479∗∗
(0.0348) (0.0358) (0.129) (0.187)
N 14355 14355 14355 14355
R2 0.356 0.367 0.322 0.282
Estimation Method OLS OLS IV IV
First Stage F (KP) 19.33 12.64
AR p-value 0.012 0.001
Socio-econ. Controls X X X X
Land Controls X X
District FE X X X X
Note – Outcome variable: Log total expenditures per worker. Conflict stan-
dardized and instrumented with distance to border. Clustered standard er-
rors at the chiefdom level in parentheses. Kleibergen-Paap cluster-robust
F statistic and p-value for weak instrument robust Anderson-Rubin test of
H0 : β = 0 reported. Stars refer to standard t-tests. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Two observations that apply to this and further results on economic outcomes
are noteworthy. First, the specification including land controls (column 4) delivers
a stronger result. This could be the case because of bias when not controlling
for land characteristics of the chiefdoms. Considering the first stage results and
the large size of the effect even without land controls, however, this could also
plausibly reflect the strength of the instrument conditional on the whole set of
socio-economic and land controls. The relevant F statistic drops from 19.33 to
12.64 when including land controls. In the spirit of a cautious interpretation of
the results, I would therefore consider the specification without land controls as
the more reliable one and take it as a more reasonable estimate of the effect of
civil war.
Second, the IV results are stronger than the OLS results. The difference
between IV and OLS results is consistent with a positive selection into conflict
in the sense that conflict takes place in areas that are richer to begin with. In
light of the fact that economic considerations played a key role in the rebels’
decision to engage in conflict this is plausible.13 At the individual level, many
13In their analysis of Rwanda, Justino & Verwimp (2013) also find that richer households
were targeted.
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young people were easily recruited by the rebel movement because engagement
in looting communities was economically more attractive than alternative ways
to make a living. At the collective level, the rebel movement aimed at controlling
and generating revenue from diamond mines as a source of income.14
A large sector shift in economic activity may be a key driver of these income
effects. The results on the main sector of work are shown in Table 2.5 (and graph-
ically displayed in Figure B4 for the preferred specification with socio-economic
controls only). With a standard deviation increase in conflict intensity, workers
are 18.5 percentage points more likely to work in agriculture and correspondingly
less likely to engage in non-agricultural activities. This means that workers in
high conflict chiefdoms (at the 75th percentile of the conflict distribution) are 23
percentage points more likely to work in agriculture than those in low conflict
chiefdoms (25th percentile). The employment share in agriculture in the whole
country is 55%. Such increases in areas experiencing more conflict constitute a
large shift in the sector allocation. Both the manufacturing and services sector
experience a loss of workers.15 Since pay in the agricultural sector is on average
just above one third of what it is in the non-agricultural sector in Sierra Leone,
a sector shift into agricultural work can be an important driving force of lower
average income.16
To the extent that education and the sector of employment are correlated, hu-
man capital loss as a result of the war may be the reason for the sector shift. In-
deed, the correlation between education and employment in agriculture is strong.
While 68% of workers without primary school education are employed in agri-
culture, this share drops to 27% for workers who finished primary school.17 The
estimation results of the effect of conflict on education are presented in Table 2.6
and 2.7. In the preferred specification in column (3), individuals are 10 percent-
14This may raise an endogeneity concern if the location of diamond mines at the beginning
of the war is correlated with the instrument. Unfortunately, no information on the location of
diamond mines in 1991 is available. Using information on their location in 2002 from Bellows
& Miguel (2009), however, I can establish that the instrument is uncorrelated with distance
to diamond mines in 2002. Furthermore, controlling for distance to diamond mines does not
change any results in the IV analysis.
15This pattern of results holds up when we consider all individuals, including the unemployed,
and not only workers. The results can be found inTable A1.
16In 2018, expenditures per worker in 20 days were on average 34 USD for agricultural workers
and 91 USD for non-agricultural workers.
17This correlation can be the result of lower returns to education in agriculture. Differential
returns by sector are a key part in the model that generates a correlation between education
and sector choice. In line with the given correlation, the structural estimation of the model








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































age points less likely to finish primary school as conflict intensity increases by
one standard deviation; or correspondingly 13 percentage points less likely when
moving from low conflict to high conflict chiefdoms (25th to 75th percentile).
Alternatively measured, individuals lose one year of schooling per standard devi-
ation of conflict (correspondingly 1.2 years as you move from low to high conflict
chiefdoms). Relative to the country-wide share of primary educated workers of
47% and an average education of 5.2 years, these are substantial losses.
Table 2.6: Years of Schooling
Years of Schooling
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Conflict -0.318∗∗ -0.392∗∗ -0.991∗ -1.758∗∗∗
(0.156) (0.163) (0.537) (0.660)
N 21396 21396 21396 21396
R2 0.355 0.363 0.350 0.343
Estimation Method OLS OLS IV IV
First Stage F (KP) 23.59 15.33
AR p-value 0.065 0.003
Socio-econ. Controls X X X X
Land Controls X X
District FE X X X X
Note – Outcome variable: Years of schooling. Conflict standardized and
instrumented with distance to border. Clustered standard errors at the
chiefdom level in parentheses. Kleibergen-Paap cluster-robust F statistic
and p-value for weak instrument robust Anderson-Rubin test of H0 : β = 0
reported. Stars refer to standard t-tests. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 2.7: Primary Education
Primary Education
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Conflict -0.0317∗∗ -0.0361∗∗ -0.102∗∗ -0.164∗∗∗
(0.0137) (0.0141) (0.0462) (0.0580)
N 21397 21397 21397 21397
R2 0.332 0.339 0.326 0.319
Estimation Method OLS OLS IV IV
First Stage F (KP) 23.59 15.33
AR p-value 0.031 0.002
Socio-econ. Controls X X X X
Land Controls X X
District FE X X X X
Note – Outcome variable: Indicator for having finished primary school. Conflict
standardized and instrumented with distance to border. Clustered standard
errors at the chiefdom level in parentheses. Kleibergen-Paap cluster-robust
F statistic and p-value for weak instrument robust Anderson-Rubin test of
H0 : β = 0 reported. Stars refer to standard t-tests. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01
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2.4.2 Identification Tests and Robustness
These results pass an important placebo test for the exogeneity of the instrument
and are robust to a number of robustness checks. First, it is reassuring to see
that the education effect only materializes for young people who were actually
at school age when the war started while there is no significant effect for those
old enough to have finished their education by that time. Table A2 demonstrates
these results. Columns (1) and (3) present the education effect for individuals
at school age when the war starts. The effect is slightly stronger than the main
effect for everyone. By contrast, columns (2) and (4) show the effect for people
above school age for both education outcomes. The coefficients are close to zero
and insignificant.
Second, the main results on worker expenditures are robust to the exclusion
of chiefdoms directly bordering Liberia. Table A3 provides the results for the
restricted sample. The effect of conflict is a 33.8% reduction in expenditures per
worker as conflict increases by one standard deviation in the preferred specifi-
cation in column (3). The coefficient is very close to the corresponding effect
for all chiefdoms (30.6%) and statistically indistinguishable. Other specifications
and OLS results are also very similar. This suggests that trade with Liberia is
unlikely to be a threat to identification.
Third, the main results on worker expenditures are robust to using different
variations of household expenditures measures. The division by the number of
workers is not driving the result. Table A4 and A5 show the results for total
household expenditures and total household expenditures per adult equivalent,
respectively. While the IV coefficients for both alternative measures are a bit
smaller than the ones reported in the main results, they are still sizeable and sig-
nificant. The reduction is around 17% per standard deviation of conflict increase
in both alternative specifications.
Fourth, the results on all outcomes are robust to the exclusion of the capital
Freetown. Bellows & Miguel (2009) argue that the capital’s local institutions
and history are quite different from the rest of the country. However, any such
differences do not seem to be driving my results since the outcomes without
Freetown are very comparable to my main results with Freetown. Table A6
shows the results on expenditures per worker, employment in agriculture, years of
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schooling and primary education when the sample excludes the capital Freetown.
All OLS and IV coefficients are very close to the ones in the main specifications
including Freetown.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter investigates the local impact of civil war in Sierra Leone. To this
end, I use information from a 2018 representative household survey about income,
sector of work as well as education of individuals as long-run outcomes. Since
the extent to which conflict occurs in different chiefdoms is not random, I exploit
the distance to the Liberian border as an instrument for conflict intensity. While
chiefdoms that are close to or far from the Liberian border are comparable within
small districts before the war, the heavy involvement of Liberia in the beginning of
the civil war means that border distance is highly predictive of conflict intensity.
With the valid instrument in hand, I establish that civil war has strong local
effects on the livelihoods of households that live in affected chiefdoms. A loss
of human capital has direct implications for worker income and can be a reason
for a shift in the sector of employment to the extent that lower education is
correlated with employment in agriculture. Workers are a lot more likely to work
in agriculture as a result of their chiefdom being hit by conflict. Since pay in
agriculture is lower than in the non-agricultural sector, such a shift is a driving
force for lower income in chiefdoms that are more heavily affected by conflict.
The presented estimates identify spatial differences. The results are essentially
generated by comparing more and less affected areas by the civil war (with the
variation generated exogenously by the instrument). If productive resources are
reallocated across space as a result of the war, however, spatial differences do not
only capture the direct effect of conflict but also the reallocation of resources. In
particular, we may be concerned about labor supply changing in locations when
people move in response to the war.
The 2011 survey indicates that around 50% of all households were displaced at
some point during or after the war. Even considering migration in the long run,
migration rates in the 2015 census and 2018 household survey are between 25%
and 30%. It is quite plausible that the selection of migrants changes as a result of
the war. For example, if more productive non-agricultural workers leave conflict
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areas during or after the war and stay in less affected areas, my estimate would
also capture this type of selective migration. The fact that income is higher in less
affected areas after the war would be partly due to the changing type of movers to
these areas. As a result, spatial income differences would overstate the aggregate
income effect of conflict. In order to understand the aggregate income effect,
the following chapter develops a model that explicitly takes into account general
equilibrium effects of the war such as selective migration. Structural estimation
of the model and counterfactual simulations allow me to estimate the aggregate
income effect of the civil war in Sierra Leone.
Further to estimating the aggregate income effect, the development and esti-
mation of the model also allows me to shed light on unobserved mechanisms of
the economic impact of civil war. While education is observed, there are other
important determinants of productivity that could be affected by the war and a
driver of the sector shift and income effects. A simple back-of-the-envelope cal-
culation of the observed effects suggests that education is unlikely to be the only
driving force of income effects. Individuals lose on average one year of schooling
while the loss in earnings is about 30% of workers’ income as conflict increases
by one standard deviation in their chiefdom. If education was the only channel
leading to income reductions, the returns to education for an additional year of
schooling would need to be 30% to generate these findings. This is an order of
magnitude larger than the typical estimates ranging between 7% and 9%.18 In the
model, other determinants of the sector shift and income effects are captured by
sector-specific firm productivities and average individual productivities beyond
education. Using the structure of the model, I can estimate these objects and
evaluate the impact that conflict has on them.
18For reviews on worldwide returns to an additional year of schooling, see for example Peet
et al. (2015) and Psacharopoulos & Patrinos (2018).
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Chapter 3
The Legacy of Conflict: Aggregate
Evidence from Sierra Leone
3.1 Introduction
This chapter builds on the preceding analysis which establishes large income
differences between more and less affected chiefdoms. However, spatial income
differences do not necessarily reflect aggregate income effects. In general equilib-
rium, people move. Therefore, spatial income differences reflect both the direct
effect of conflict and the reallocation of labor.
One purpose of the general equilibrium model I develop in this chapter is to
address this issue. The general equilibrium structure allows me to estimate aggre-
gate income effects. Another purpose is to provide a theoretical framework and
estimation of the underlying mechanisms. Importantly, I can include mechanisms
that are not directly observed in the data but which I can identify in a structural
estimation of the model. The basic setup is an economic geography model with
151 locations reflecting the chiefdoms of Sierra Leone. To capture population
movement and a sector shift in response to the war, the model features labor
mobility across these locations and two sectors, agriculture and non-agriculture.
Individuals are heterogeneous in individual productivities for each destination
and sector as well as exogenous education realizations. In a Roy (1951) fashion,
this gives rise to worker sorting into a destination and sector. Locations differ in
amenities such as local public goods and services and firm-level productivities in
each sector.
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Conflict is assumed to affect four sets of parameters with both direct and
indirect implications for aggregate income: (i) (observed) education, (ii) (unob-
served) firm-level productivities, (iv) (unobserved) individual productivities and
(iii) (unobserved) amenities. Structural estimation identifies the model parame-
ters. In particular, I use observed incomes and migration flows to estimate firm
and individual productivities as well as location amenities. To estimate the causal
impact of conflict on these parameters, I use the same IV strategy as in chapter
2. With these estimates in hand, I perform counterfactual simulations which es-
timate the aggregate income effect of conflict. The simulations take into account
general equilibrium changes.
The general equilibrium model highlights how conflict affects income and sec-
tor allocation. Education, firm productivity, individual productivity and ameni-
ties can change in response to conflict. This has direct effects in the locations
affected and indirect effects in general equilibrium when people move and market
wages change. Increasing conflict leads to a reduction of the share of primary
school educated people by 6.9 percentage points. Returns to education are es-
timated to be higher in non-agriculture than in agriculture which implies that
education losses harm the non-agricultural sector more and can lead to a sector
shift into agriculture. Lower human capital also directly decreases income in both
sectors. As for firm productivities, I show that conflict affects the sectors differen-
tially. While there is no effect on agricultural firm productivity, non-agricultural
firm productivity reduces by 28.4% per standard deviation of conflict. Natu-
rally, a firm productivity loss in non-agriculture is also consistent with the sector
shift into agricultural work and income losses in non-agriculture. Average indi-
vidual productivities decrease by 12.2% per standard deviation of conflict, but
only among the uneducated. This reduces income of workers born in chiefdoms
affected by conflict.
Beyond these direct effects, education losses, non-agricultural firm produc-
tivity reductions and a decrease in individual productivity among the unedu-
cated have important general equilibrium implications. People move in response
to these changes. Workers are assumed to be mobile subject to a migration
cost that is specific to their level of education and their sector of work. Three
forces governing how migration changes are worth highlighting. First, the sector
shift leads to changed relative wages between the sectors in affected locations
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which has an impact on the composition of in- and out-migrants. Second, lower
non-agricultural firm productivity in chiefdoms hit by conflict generally encour-
ages non-agricultural workers to leave those locations. Third, the composition
of migrants changes in response to lower education in affected chiefdoms since
migration cost is higher for uneducated workers than for educated workers in
agriculture. The composition of stayers in conflict affected chiefdoms will there-
fore consist of more uneducated agricultural workers which tend to have lower
productivity and work in the less productive sector.
Since amenities are not sector-specific and are a component of utility but not
of income, any amenity changes would only result in aggregate income effects
through general equilibrium effects of worker movement. However, the estimated
effect of conflict on amenities is small and insignificant. In the long run, amenities
seem to remain unaffected by the civil war.
General equilibrium effects imply that the observed sector allocation and in-
come difference between more and less affected chiefdoms by conflict reflects not
only the direct effect of conflict but also selective migration. In particular, the
changes in the spatial allocation of labor in response to the war described above
would suggest a positive selection of migrants out of high conflict chiefdoms.
Therefore, the spatial divergence in income may overstate the aggregate income
effect. To address this issue, I use the model to simulate counterfactual scenarios
that reverse conflict and all general equilibrium effects associated with it. In the
first simulation, I consider a full reversal of the war. In this scenario, the educa-
tion, non-agricultural firm productivity and individual productivity loss among
the uneducated are reverted. A second set of simulations serves to assess the
quantitative importance of the channels. I revert the effect on the three sets of
parameters separately.
The first scenario estimates an aggregate income loss of 31.6% in the Sierra
Leonean economy today relative to a simulated peace economy. The aggregate
share of agricultural workers is 20.8 percentage points higher than it would be
in the absence of war. An effect of conflict on non-agricultural firm productivity
alone would lead to an aggregate income reduction by 17.8%. By contrast, an
effect on average individual productivity among the uneducated or on education
only would lead to an aggregate income reduction by 10.5% or 3.7%, respectively.
Therefore, firm productivity losses seem to be the most important driver of the
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civil war impact on the Sierra Leonean economy.
While the estimate on the full war effect is large, it is still substantially lower
than what the reduced-form evidence on spatial divergence suggests. If we were
to take the reduced-form estimate and calculate a country-wide weighted average
by conflict intensity and chiefdom population we would arrive at a 46% aggregate
income loss. This suggests that general equilibrium forces such as selective mi-
gration play a major role in generating spatial income differences between more
and less affected chiefdoms by conflict.
This chapter makes two main contributions. First, it provides estimates of
the long-run aggregate income effect of civil war that explicitly take into account
general equilibrium forces. While early cross-country macro studies (Alesina &
Perotti, 1996; Barro, 1991; Collier, 1999) show a clear negative link between
conflict and aggregate economic performance, establishing causality from these
correlations is difficult.1 A great number of institutional and economic differ-
ences between war-torn countries and countries at peace may drive the result.
On the other hand, micro-empirical within-country studies that compare more
and less affected households or locations such as Miguel & Roland (2011), Besley
& Reynal-Querol (2014), Serneels & Verpoorten (2015) and Abadie & Gardeaz-
abal (2003) are similar in nature to the reduced-form analysis presented in the
previous chapter. As Blattman & Miguel (2010) note, even with a solid identi-
fication strategy, this approach cannot account for general equilibrium effects. I
combine the best of both worlds. Using a within-country identification strategy
in combination with a general equilibrium model allows me to estimate aggre-
gate effects that can causally be attributed to the civil war. To the best of my
knowledge, this is the first study to estimate a general equilibrium model in the
analysis of conflict.2
The model I develop is an economic geography model that draws on Bryan &
Morten (2019), Hsieh et al. (2019) and Eaton & Kortum (2002).3 In particular,
civil war typically leads to the reallocation of labor across space with important
1Cerra & Saxena (2008) is similar to these analyses but broader in scope since it considers
not only civil war but also financial crises. The authors estimate impulse response functions
using a panel of many countries over several decades.
2Dal Bó & Dal Bó (2011) use a general equilibrium model in their analysis of conflict.
However, their paper is about the causes of conflict and not about the general equilibrium
consequences of it. It is also purely theoretical. They do not make use of data, let alone carry
out structural estimation.
3The model also has similarities with elements in Allen & Arkolakis (2014), Redding (2016)
and Lagakos & Waugh (2013).
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general equilibrium implications. This concerns not only the size of population
movement but also the selection. Indeed, Davis & Weinstein (2002) and Brakman
et al. (2004) find that city growth is unaffected by bombing intensity. However,
this does not speak to the selection of migrants. In this study, I also find that the
number of migrants is unaffected by conflict but the selection of migrants seems
to play a major role in accounting for spatial differences in income as a result of
the war.4
The second contribution of this chapter is to shed light on a channel of the
impact of conflict that has received little attention so far: reverse structural
transformation, in particular as fuelled by decreases in non-agricultural firm pro-
ductivity. This can capture a variety of elements that could be affected by war
such as market access or electricity connection. My model features labor as the
only input into production. Immobile physical capital would enter the model in
the same way as firm-level productivity. Therefore, reductions in the latter could
also capture physical capital reductions such as the destruction of local buildings
or machines.
While there are few analyses of firm or sector allocation outcomes of conflict,
human capital outcomes have received much more attention.5 Yet, I show that
the role of human capital losses in explaining persistent aggregate income effects
is limited relative to the role of firm productivity reductions in Sierra Leone. De-
pending on which factors are the main drivers behind persistent consequences of
conflict for economic welfare, the implications for post-war policy differ greatly.
My analysis suggests that restoring firm productivity deserves greater policy fo-
cus.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 3.2, I develop
the model in theory while I discuss its estimation strategy in section 3.3. Section
3.4 presents the results of the model estimation, followed by the presentation
and discussion of counterfactual simulations in section 3.5. Finally, section 3.6
concludes.
4This result is also in line with other papers that highlight the importance of selective
migration in explaining spatial income differences such as Young (2013).
5See chapter 2.1 for a brief overview of the relevant papers.
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3.2 Model Theory
The model is a static general equilibrium economic geography model. The basic
setup draws on Bryan & Morten (2019) and Hsieh et al. (2019) and contains
elements that are similar to other work in quantitative economic geography, in
particular Eaton & Kortum (2002), Allen & Arkolakis (2014) and Redding (2016).
In order to capture basic characteristics of the Sierra Leonean economy and the
key pathways how conflict affects the economy, the model contains the following
principal features that are motivated by the reduced-form results.
First, the high migration rate in Sierra Leone with movement potentially
responding to conflict motivate an economic geography setup with endogenous
location choice. Workers choose locations on the basis of an individual location-
specific productivity and subject to migration cost. Furthermore, locations differ
in aggregate firm productivities and amenities, both of which can be affected by
conflict. In this way, conflict can change the spatial allocation of labor.
Second, the reduced-form results indicate that the sector allocation is an im-
portant pathway how conflict affects the economy. Therefore, the model features
an agricultural and non-agricultural sector. Workers sort into sectors on the basis
of individual sector-specific productivities. Firm productivities are also sector-
specific and govern sector choice. A differential effect of conflict on firm produc-
tivities by sectors can be one mechanism how conflict affects sector allocation.
Third, education and employment in the non-agricultural sector are highly
correlated in Sierra Leone. This could be the result of differing returns to ed-
ucation across sectors. With sector-specific returns to education, an education
loss resulting from conflict can have both direct effects on income and indirect
effects through a change in the sector composition. To capture this mechanism,
the model features education with differential returns by sector.
This structure6 allows me to lay out both the direct effects of conflict and the
indirect effects through a change in the sector composition and spatial allocation
of labor. By explicitly taking into account general equilibrium forces, I am able
to estimate aggregate income effects when estimating the model in a next step.
6The structure of labor mobility under movement cost and destination choice based on
individual productivity draws is comparable to the core structure in Bryan & Morten (2019).
Conceptually similar to the industries in Hsieh et al. (2019), I have two sectors and sector-
specific individual productivity draws. I also introduce human capital with differential returns
to education by sector. Relevant to my context, this gives rise to worker sorting across sectors
on the basis of both (firm and individual) productivities and education.
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While the reduced-form results identify spatial income differences, aggregate in-
come effects may be very different if there is a strong spatial reallocation of labor
in response to the war. In addition, estimating unobserved parameters such as
firm and average individual productivities as well as amenities using the structure
of the model allows me to consider potential mechanisms of a conflict impact on
income that are not directly observed in the data.
3.2.1 Basic setup
Economic environment. The economy consists of 151 locations (chiefdoms)
with the set of them denoted by K and comprises a continuum of individuals
indexed by i. They are born in an origin chiefdom c ∈ K and can decide to move
to destination chiefdom d ∈ K where they work in a particular sector S ∈ {A,N},
either agriculture or non-agriculture. Movement is costly and differs by sector and
education level. Movement cost is denoted by τSecd and enters as a utility cost.
In an Armington (1969) fashion, each location produces a unique agricultural
and non-agricultural good that is consumed everywhere. This structure serves as
a dispersion force. In order to keep the model as simple as possible, I abstract from
trade cost and assume that goods are traded costlessly across space.7 Locations
differ in the firm productivities in each sector ASd and amenities ad.
In the spirit of Roy (1951), workers are heterogeneous in their productivity
which is specific to both the sector and the destination they choose to work in
(or the sectoral product that is produced in that destination). Workers are also
endowed with an exogenous education level e.8
Preferences. Individuals have CES preferences over all goods produced in each
sector and destination. They consume quantity cSid of the good produced in
sector S and destination d. Their utility is also influenced by amenities in their
destination ad and the cost of moving to that destination and choosing their sector
to work in τSecd. The utility function is therefore
7Empirically, a lack of sufficient data on trade between chiefdoms or price differences across
chiefdoms also prevent the estimation of a model featuring trade cost. Appendix D.1 outlines
briefly what the introduction of trade cost in the model would mean. Section 3.5.3 discusses
the implications for my results.
8Education is assumed to be exogenous for the sake of simplicity. Conflict is assumed to
affect education directly as an exogenous parameter. However, making education endogenous
and considering conflict as a shock to an exogenous education cost parameter delivers results
that are conceptually equivalent to the model with exogenous education. An extension with
endogenous education choice and exogenous education cost is outlined in Appendix D.2.
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where σ denotes the elasticity of substitution. In line with standard economic
geography models, amenities can be thought of to capture elements such as nat-
ural beauty, the availability of local public goods and services and the quality
of housing. In the particular context of this conflict study, an additional way
to think of what amenities capture would be the safety of a place. They enter
multiplicatively in the utility function.
Like migration cost, they play a key role in workers’ location choice. I model
migration cost τSecd as the share of income that workers with education e lose
when moving from c to d and choosing sector S. Migration cost can be thought
of in several ways. One is the actual physical cost of moving away from home.
Beyond that and potentially much more importantly, however, this parameter
captures the cost of integration into a new community in order to be able to work
there. In the Sierra Leonean context, chiefdoms still have traditional chiefdom
administrations and strong local governance structures. Traditional chiefs who
are members of locally well-known and respected so-called “ruling families” govern
many parts of public life. In this context, integration into a new community is
an important factor to be able to live and work there.
This cost τSecd is assumed to be both education- and sector-specific. The
motivation behind this is threefold. First, this is the most general type of moving
cost the model could allow for. I am able to estimate this cost non-parametrically
and therefore let the data decide to what extent moving cost may actually differ
across sectors and education levels. Second, a growing theoretical and empirical
literature suggests that moving cost may differ by education level.9 Reasons
cited here are, for example, a better state of information about opportunities in
different places among more educated people or greater availability of valuable job
matches. Third, with sector dependence this parameter captures any friction of
entering the non-agricultural sector. This may be due to the necessity of moving
to a larger town within the same location for non-agricultural employment. This
could also embody the fact that non-agricultural work requires connections or
fixed investments for people born in rural areas where agricultural work is the
9See, for example, Amior (2015); Kennan & Walker (2011); Wozniak (2010).
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default option. Empirically, it turns out that such frictions are quite real. Given
the estimated large wage differences between workers in agriculture and non-
agriculture (even accounting for selection on individual productivities), such a
friction can rationalize the relatively high number of workers in agriculture.
Costless trade of goods results in common prices for each good pSd and a










Workers supply lSid effective units of labor in the sector and destination of
their choice and are getting paid at the wage rate wSd . Their nominal income
is therefore mSid = wSd lSid. Standard CES utility maximization results in indirect





Productivities and labor supply. Workers draw individual productivities
for each sector and destination zSid from a Fréchet distribution. The average
productivity draw is different for each sector and destination and it also varies
by origin and education level. For workers from origin c with education level
e, the average productivity draw for sector S and destination d is captured in
the scale parameter qSecd. Along with independence, this results in the following













where z denotes the vector of productivity draws and the shape parameter
θ governs the dispersion of productivities. A high realization of θ means low
dispersion, that is, productivities for the goods produced in different destinations
are close to each other. One interpretation of this would be a high degree of
similarity across products produced in different destinations.
In this formulation, workers from origin c with education e are, on average,
the same in the sense that they draw from the same productivity distribution.
Let qSecd = qecεSecd, that is, average productivity draws are made up of a common
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component qec for all workers from origin chiefdom c with education e and some
variation across sectors and destination with mean 1. This common component
essentially captures the average individual productivity draw that someone from
origin c with education e has. While the remaining variation of the scale param-
eter εSecd is assumed to be random, the common component qec may well be a
function of chiefdom’s characteristics. These are characteristics that shape how
productive people will be who are born and grow up in an origin chiefdom c
with education e. Differences in the common component qec across origins and
education levels therefore capture the idea that some origins have better capabil-
ities to produce high-productivity individuals, e.g., better healthcare, quality of
schooling, childcare, etc.
Apart from productivities, workers also differ in the exogenous realization of
their education level e which determines human capital in a standard Mincerian
way. Let φS be the sector-specific returns to education. Human capital for workers
with education e is exogenous and assumed to be
hSe = exp(φ
Se) (3.5)
Human capital is combined with a worker’s productivity draw to determine






Sector and destination choice. Using the expression for labor supply 3.6 in







where vSecd := ad(1 − τSecd)wSd hSe . This essentially captures the wage rate in
destination-sector (d, S) adjusted for amenities, movement cost and human cap-
ital. From the distribution of productivities, it follows that indirect utility for
workers from origin c with education e across sectors and destinations follows a






. Based on this distribution, we
can characterize workers’ sector and destination choice. The probability that a
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This equation describes worker sorting behavior. If the adjusted wage rate
in a particular chiefdom and sector is high relative to all other chiefdoms and
sectors, the chiefdom and sector are attractive to work in.
In a similar way, properties of the Fréchet distribution give rise to the following













where Γ(·) is the Gamma function.10 Average productivity in a destination-
sector (d, S) depends negatively on the share of workers choosing that destination
d and sector S. This reflects a selection mechanism. The marginal migrant
who chooses to make that move is the one drawn from the leftmost part of the
distribution with the lowest productivity. This selection mechanism is displayed
graphically for sector choice in Figure 3.1. The negative relationship between
the share of workers choosing (d, S) and average productivity in that destination-
sector pair giving rise to this selection mechanism is a result of alignment of
comparative and absolute advantage. Graphically, this is represented by the
upward sloping curves in the figure. This assumption of alignment is hard-baked
into the model by using independent Fréchet draws. Heckman & Honore (1990)
refer to this as the standard case and it is intuitively appealing that those workers
who have a comparative advantage for working in a particular destination-sector
pair would also absolutely perform better there.11
This formulation of average productivities is useful to represent the relation-














10Derivations of equation 3.8 and 3.9 are provided in the Appendix, section C.
11Lagakos & Waugh (2013) and Adao (2016) expand on this notion more formally. Lagakos
& Waugh (2013) also provide an alternative multivariate characterization of the Fréchet dis-
tribution using the Frank copula and arbitrary correlation between productivity draws. This
version does not automatically generate alignment between comparative and absolute advan-
tage. The aim of their analysis is indeed to allow for different cases and let the data in their
global cross-country analysis decide whether they find evidence of such alignment. This turns
out to be the case.
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Figure 3.1: Worker Selection
Note – This graph shows the sector choice response within a location as wages change.
A higher wage in non-agriculture implies more people choosing to work in this sector.
As a result of comparative and absolute advantage being aligned (both curves upward
sloping), the average productivity of the movers is lower than that of the stayers in
N . Therefore, overall average productivity in that sector must go down.
Since average productivity determines average income in a sector S and des-
tination d for all workers from c with education e, the same negative relationship
with the share of workers manifests here. The strength of this negative relation-
ship is governed by the size of 1/θ. Lower productivity dispersion (high θ) leads
to a small size of 1/θ and therefore little reactivity of average income to the share
of workers from c with education e choosing (d, S). This is intuitively appealing.
Low productivity dispersion implies that the marginal migrant worker is very
similar to previous migrants in terms of their productivity.
Equation 3.8 and 3.10 are the key estimating equations to determine parame-
ters of the model. The estimation exploits the fact that migration flows πSecd and
average incomes mSecd are observed in the data.
Production. Production is linear in the sole input of production, labor LSd .
Within sectors and destinations, perfectly competing firms are identical and the
representative firm deploys firm-level productivity ASd .12 Therefore, production
12The Armington structure gives rise to this productivity term that is specific to the unique
good produced in sector S and destination d. An alternative way of modelling, similar to
Tombe & Zhu (2019), would have the production of two aggregate final goods in the economy,
agricultural and non-agricultural, that are both made up of a continuum of intermediate goods.
In each location, any number of varieties of the intermediate good can be produced and traded
and all chiefdoms have location- and product-specific productivity draws for the production of
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of the unique good in sector S and destination d is





Denote the set of workers with education level e from origin c choosing to live
in destination d and work in in sector S by MSecd. The labor force in a particular











Firms are paying the wage rate wSd per effective unit of labor supplied. Perfect






3.2.2 Equilibrium and Conflict Impact
Market clearing and equilibrium. Market clearing implies that total pro-










where CSd denotes total consumption of the good produced in destination d
and sector S and GDP denotes GDP or total income in the economy. The second
equality comes from CES preferences over all goods.
Using the definition of individual labor supply 3.6 and the characterization of
average productivity in a destination-sector 3.9, we can reformulate total labor
supply in a destination-sector as a function of labor movement across space πSecd


















intermediate goods. As a result, chiefdoms specialize in the goods that they are most productive
at. While conflict is assumed to affect ASd in the provided model, it would be a shock to the
average productivity draw in the alternative setting (e.g. the scale parameter on a Fréchet
distribution). Conceptually, all results discussed here would still go through. The Armington
structure simply provides a stronger dispersion force such that labor mobility in response to
conflict effects would be stronger in the alternative setting.
45
where Nec is the birth population in origin c with education level e. Noting
that the movement probabilities πSecd are itself a function of exogenous parame-
ters and endogenous wage rates wSd , substituting equation 3.13 in for prices and
taking the ratio of the market clearing conditions across a sector or destina-
tion, the model can be solved as the following system of equations in endogenous












∀S, T ∈ {A,N} ∀d, f ∈ K (3.16)
The impact of conflict. Even though the way conflict affects an economy is
a dynamic phenomenon, we can analyze it by considering comparative statics
in the provided (primarily) static model that does not explicitly feature time
periods. Conflict can be modelled as a change to the fundamental parameters,
in response to which people choose destination and sectors of work. This model
structure has an implicit timing assumption. The empirical analysis focuses on
outcomes in 2018 and is limited to individuals who were born before the end
of the war in 2001 (and therefore working-age adults in 2018). Consider 1991
as the initial situation of the economy before the war. The war between 1991
and 2001 affects four sets of parameters: (i) education realizations of those from
affected (origin) chiefdoms, (ii) firm productivities in (destination) chiefdoms,
(iii) individual productivities of those from affected (origin) chiefdoms, and (iv)
amenities in (destination) chiefdoms. As a function of the parameter values in
the war economy, individuals decide on destinations and sectors. We observe
the post-war equilibrium in 2018. Essentially, we therefore require the moving
decision to take place after the shock of the war and after education has realized.
This is largely borne out in the data. The median age at migration is 19 years
with 79% of the sample moving after the age of 12 which is the typical age of
finishing primary school.13 The median moving year in the observed sample is
2003 with 82% of migrants having moved after the war has started.
The effect of conflict on the four sets of parameters can be thought of in the
following way. First, consider the effect on education. The destruction of schools
13The empirical identification in section 3.3 considers a simple binary indicator for having ob-
tained primary school education as the education realization e. This keeps the model relatively
simple and reflects the fact that primary education is still the main educational qualification for
a large part of the population. Less than 10% of the sample have secondary or higher education.
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and killings of teachers can plausibly result in individuals losing out on education
in their chiefdom of origin. If individuals have a worse realization of education e,
this directly translates into lower human capital hSe = exp(φSe). To what extent
sector-specific human capital suffers from the education reduction is governed by
the returns to education in each sector φS.
Second, conflict may affect firm-level productivities ASd in each sector and
destination. In the model, this parameter would essentially capture any sector-
specific determinant of productivity. For example, it could entail the destruction
of essential infrastructure for production in a sector. It could also capture immo-
bile physical capital. I do not model physical capital here explicitly. To the extent
that physical capital is immobile, however, this would enter the model in exactly
the same way as ASd . Any destruction of physical capital without reconstruction
in the long run would therefore be captured by a reduction of ASd .
Third, conflict may affect average individual productivity draws qec for people
from origin chiefdom c with education e. Conceptually distinct from the effect on
firm productivities ASd that affect everyone who chooses to work in a particular
sector and destination (irrespective of where they are from), the idea of this effect
is that it harms all individuals who are born and grow up in a certain origin c
and have education e (irrespective of where they choose to live and work). A
change in qec due to conflict captures any effect that the war has on chiefdom
characteristics shaping such origin productivities. This may include an effect on
the state of healthcare, in particular for newborns and infants, or the quality of
education (given the level of education e which enters the model separately).14
Fourth, conflict may have an impact on the amenities of a chiefdom ad. If
fighting leads to the destruction of local public goods or a generally risky envi-
ronment to live in, this would be captured by the amenities in the model.
Changes to these parameter have direct implications for income of workers and
indirect implications by changing the allocation of labor across sectors and space.
Figure 3.2 shows these relationships in a diagram. Provided that σ is large,15
the market clearing condition 3.16 reveals that changes to firm-level productiv-
14Indeed, the working-age population considered in 2018 is quite young when the war starts.
This is necessary for interpreting changes in qec due to conflict as shocks in early life. The
median age of individuals at the start of the war is 6 years with 36% of the sample being born
during the war.
15As discussed in section 3.3.3, I set σ = 4 in the model estimation and discuss the relevant
literature that suggests at least such a large value.
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ities have a first-order impact on labor unit wage rates. By contrast, changes
to education, average individual productivities and amenities only affect wages
through the general equilibrium channel by affecting labor supply in each sector
and destination. This means that shocks to firm-level productivities have first-
order impacts on income as well as sector and destination choice through their
direct impact on wage rates.16
Figure 3.2: Key Mechanisms in the Model
Note – This diagram depicts the key mechanisms how conflict affects income both
directly and indirectly in the model.
The effect on income is straightforward. Worker income is a direct function
of the sector-destination wage rate wSd , human capital hSe and average individual
productivities qec. Hence, reductions in education, firm productivities and average
individual productivities directly decrease income.
For the effect on sector and destination choice, it is instructive to consider
the ratio of πSecd across sectors and locations to see how conflict changes the labor





















By equation 3.17, any changes in firm-level productivities affect sector choice
to the extent that one sector is hit harder than the other through the first-order
impact of ASd on wage rates wSd . If non-agricultural firm productivity decreases
to a greater extent than agricultural firm productivity, this leads to a decrease
16The intuition for this positive first-oder impact of ASd on w
S
d is straight-forward. Consider
an increase in ASd . As a result, marginal cost decreases and the price drops. Demand rises and
the wage adjusts on the labor market to enable increased production.
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in the relative wage wNd /wAd with the implication that individuals move out of
sector N into sector A.
Education has a direct impact on sector choice within a location to the extent
that returns to education differ by sector. In particular, if φN > φA, workers are
more likely to work in agriculture as conflict negatively affects their education
since education losses translate into a greater human capital loss in sector N .
A countervailing general equilibrium force that softens this shift in the sector
allocation is the wage rate reaction. By the equilibrium condition 3.16, an increase
in non-agricultural workers puts downward pressure on wages in that sector.
Changes in average individual productivities have an impact on sector choice
only through such a general equilibrium effect on wage rates to the extent that
wage rates across sectors are affected differentially. This is true if average individ-
ual productivities are differentially changed by education level since differential
returns to education across sectors generate a correlation between education level
and sector of employment. In particular, if average individual productivities de-
crease among the uneducated to a greater extent than among the educated, the
agricultural sector that employs relatively more uneducated workers experiences
a greater loss in labor supply. This translates into a relative wage increase in
agriculture through the equilibrium condition 3.16 which subsequently leads to a
sector shift into agriculture.
Changes in amenities do not have any direct or indirect effect on the sector
composition since amenities are not sector-specific but they affect location choice.
Equation 3.18 represents the probability of leaving relative to the probability of
staying at home within a given sector S. Considering a conflict effect at origin,
as ac decreases workers are more likely to leave. Similarly, if firm productivities
at home go down wage rates wSc decrease which encourages leaving.
General equilibrium changes in wage rates in response to education or av-
erage individual productivity changes affect the spatial allocation of labor. In
particular, if education or average individual productivity decreases, labor sup-
ply decreases which puts upward pressure on wage rates and encourages staying.
Education losses can also lead to direct effects on location choice if moving cost
differs by education level. In particular, if moving is more costly for the unedu-
cated, τS0cd > τS1cd, a decrease in education encourages more stayers.
Apart from potentially changing the number of movers, the interplay of ed-
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ucation, firm productivity, average individual productivity and amenity changes
as a result of conflict may also change the composition of movers. How the com-
position changes depends on the existence and strengths of the effects discussed
above. This is, among others, shaped by parameter realizations such as differen-
tial returns to education by sector, differential moving cost by education and the
extent to which conflict affects the parameters of the model.
3.3 Model Estimation
This section describes how the parameters of the model and the extent to which
they are affected by conflict are estimated. While education outcomes are ob-
served in the data, firm-level productivities, average individual productivities and
amenities are not. The structure of the model allows for a recursive estimation
strategy in four steps, similar to the estimation strategy used by Bryan & Morten
(2019). First, I use a measure of observed income variance to identify the Fréchet
shape parameter θ that captures the dispersion of individual productivities. Sec-
ond, the variation of income across sectors, space and education levels identifies
labor unit wage rates wSd , returns to education φS and the common component
of the Fréchet scale parameter by origin and education qec which measures aver-
age individual productivities. The model definition of average incomes (equation
3.10) is used as a regression equation in this step. Third, from estimated wage
rates in each location and sector wSd I can infer firm-level productivities ASd us-
ing the market clearing conditions. Fourth, I make use of the fact that location
and sector choice depend on amenity and wage rate differences across space and
sectors as well as migration cost (equation 3.8). Conditional on estimated wage
rates wSd , observed migration flows and sector choices identify amenities ad and
migration cost τSecd.
3.3.1 Step 1: Estimating Productivity Dispersion θ













To use this and further relationships from the model in the estimation, I
construct a dataset in which the unit of observation is a (c, e, d, S) cell on the mi-
gration matrix. Throughout, the education realization is a simple binary variable
indicating whether workers have finished primary school or not. For each origin-
education pair (151 origin chiefdoms × 2 education levels), I consider outcomes
in each destination-sector pair (151 destination chiefdoms × 2 sectors).17
The left-hand side of equation 3.19 is the squared coefficient of variation of
income. How income varies within a destination-sector for people sharing the
same origin and education level identifies the dispersion of individual produc-
tivities. The intuition is that this group of workers faces the same wage rates,
human capital and average individual productivity and is selected in the same
way. Therefore, the only element that can explain how their income varies is
variation in their individual productivities.
Using the observed moment on the left-hand side in each (c, e, d, S) cell, I
perform a general method-of-moment estimation of θ. For the second moment on
the Fréchet distribution to exist, θ needs to exceed 2. In this admissible range of
θ values greater than 2, the function has a unique solution.
3.3.2 Step 2: Estimating Wage Rates wSd , Education Re-
turns φS and Average Individual Productivities qec
Taking the logarithm of equation 3.10 yields the following regression equation:














where IA is a dummy variable for the agricultural sector. Average income
for workers with origin-education (c, e) who choose destination-sector (d, S) is
determined by the wage rate in that destination-sector, their human capital and
the average individual productivity draw qSecd = qecεSecd. The share of workers
πSecd with origin c and education e who choose destination d and sector S enters
17The 151 chiefdoms consist of 146 observed chiefdoms (5 missing in the 2018 household
data, 3 missing in the 2011 household data with conflict information) in all but the Western
Region, the four chiefdoms in the Western Rural District and taking the capital Freetown as
one chiefdom.
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as a selection term: The more people make that choice, the lower the average
productivity (see discussion above and Figure 3.1).
Observing πSecd and having estimated θ, we can fully control for this selection
mechanism by plugging this information into the equation. Taking ln εSecd with
mean 0 as an error term,18 a regression19 of lnmSecd +
1
θ
ln πSecd on destination-
sector fixed effects, origin-education fixed effects and observed education realiza-
tion times sector choice identifies the wage rates wSd , origin-education component
of the average individual productivity qec, and differential returns to education
in the two sectors φA − φN .20 Intuitively, controlling for the selection into a des-
tination and sector, variation in income across space, sector and education levels
identifies the wage rates, average individual productivities and returns to educa-
tion.21 Using the θ estimates from Step 1, I can recover estimates of wSd from the
destination-sector fixed effects.
3.3.3 Step 3: Computing Labor Supply LSd and Firm Pro-
ductivity ASd
Using estimates from the previous steps and observed origin populations by edu-
cation level Nec allows me to compute labor supply in each destination and sector
as stated in equation 3.15. Having computed labor supplies and drawing on my
wSd estimates from Step 2, I only need an estimate of the elasticity of substitution
σ to proceed with the identification of firm-level productivities ASd . I borrow the
18The motivation for taking ln εSecd as an error term is that this is assumed to be random
variation in the average individual productivities, after taking out the origin-education common
component qec. Conceptually, assuming randomness here is innocuous. If people were partic-
ularly productive in some sectors or destinations (across all origins or education levels), the
estimation here essentially loads this onto the sector-destination fixed effects which are used
in the next step to identify firm productivities ASd . Roughly speaking, when observing high
income in a particular sector-destination, this means that I cannot disentangle whether this
comes from high individual productivity draws for that sector-destination or because firms in
that sector-destination are very productive. Taking ln εSecd as a random error term, the estima-
tion strategy always identifies this as firm productivity. However, conceptually, this distinction
does not seem relevant. If all individuals working for firms in a particular sector-destination
are particularly productive, this can be interpreted as high firm productivity.
19In order to be able to make use of information when πSecd = 0 and deal with potential het-
eroskedasticity issues introducing bias in this log-specification, I follow Silva & Tenreyro (2006)
and make use of Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimation for this equation.
20With sector-origin fixed effects, I am not able to separately identify φA, φN and qec. Instead,
I can identify φA − φN , ln q0c for the uneducated and φN + ln q1c for the educated. For all
further estimations and simulations, however, this information suffices since average individual
productivities qec and human capital exp(φSe) only enter jointly in these calculations.
21Destination-sector fixed effects and origin-education fixed effects are only identified up
to scale relative to each other since origins and destinations are the same locations. As a
normalization, I choose the origin-education fixed effect of Freetown to be 0 with the implication
that exp(φN )q1,Freetown = 1. Therefore, all other origin scale parameter average estimates qec
are evaluated relative to the distribution for educated people in the capital.
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value from the literature and set σ = 4.22
With these values in hand, firm-level productivities are identified up to scale












∀S, T ∈ {A,N} ∀d, f ∈ K (3.21)
I normalize ANFreetown ≡ 1 and can then recover ASd for each destination and
sector one-by-one. The normalization essentially implies that all values of ASd are
measured relative to non-agricultural firm productivity in the capital.23
3.3.4 Step 4: Estimating Amenities ad and Migration Cost
τSecd
In order to estimate amenities and movement cost across sectors and destinations,
I consider the share of leavers within a sector relative to stayers. This yields the
following equations (the logarithm of equation 3.18):
ln πSecd − ln πSecc
θ
= ln ad − ln ac + lnwSd − lnwSc
+ ln(1− τSecd)− ln(1− τSecc) + ln εSecd − ln εSecc
(3.22)
Using estimated θ, wSc and observed migration flows across sectors and des-
tinations πSecd, equation 3.22 identifies amenities up to scale. I treat the whole
expression on the bottom involving τ and ε as a residual in a regression. The
amenities are coefficients on the regressor Id=k−Ic=k which is a destination minus
an origin dummy variable. Intuitively, controlling for wage rate differences across
space, migration flows are governed by amenity differences between locations and
migration cost.
Under the assumption of symmetric migration cost, amenity differences and
migration cost can be identified separately. In this case, amenity differences
22I follow papers that make use of a similar elasticity of substitution. Bryan & Morten (2019)
and Allen & Arkolakis (2014) consider an elasticity of substitution of Armington goods across
space within a country but do not have a sector dimension. They use a value of 8 for the
elasticity. Hsieh et al. (2019) and Bernard et al. (2003) use values between 3 and 4 for the
substitution between goods across industries and countries, respectively. Conceptually, the fact
that the good I consider varies across both sectors and space makes it most comparable to the
notion of different industries. I therefore choose a value of 4 but discuss robustness of my main
results to values of σ between 4 and 8 in section 3.5.3.
23An introduction of trade cost in the classic iceberg format would have an implication for
the estimation of ASd in this step. This is briefly outlined in Appendix D.1.
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shape migration flows asymmetrically while migration cost affects migration flows
symmetrically. If amenities in location d are much larger than in location c, few
people move from d to c while many people make the opposite move. If migration
cost between the two locations is large, few people move both ways.24
In the same spirit as before with firm-level productivities, I normalize every-
thing against the capital and set aFreetown ≡ 1. For the same reasons as before
in step 2, I make use of Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimation
for this equation.
Using the symmetry assumption of migration cost, adding equation 3.22 for
the flow from c to d and the flow from d to c yields an expression of bi-directional
migration flows that is only a function of migration cost, random variation and












Focusing on the τ elements, this expression picks up precisely how the sym-
metric element of migration flows is governed by migration cost. If few people
move both ways between c and d relative to those who stay at home, this must
be driven by high migration cost.
The τ expression on the right hand side uncovers migration cost between two
locations relative to the cost of staying at home in both locations. The cost
to enter a particular sector at home may be different for agriculture and non-
agriculture. In particular, suppose it is costless for people to stay at home and
work in agriculture, that is, τAecc = 0. In this case, τNecc captures the cost to enter
the non-agricultural sector. This may be driven by the fixed cost to set up a
business or the need to move to an urban area (even within the same chiefdom)
to engage in non-agricultural work. In order to capture this cost, I use the sector
share differential within a location (the logarithm of equation 3.17):
24Asymmetries in migration cost between two locations, that is τSecd 6= τSedc, would be loaded
onto the amenity estimate. Since amenities are the same across education levels and sectors
within a location while migration cost is education- and sector-specific, the amenity estimate
would be a composite of amenities and the average asymmetry in migration cost across education
and sectors. This would only affect the interpretation of the estimate, but not any substantial
results in counterfactual simulations performed below.
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lnπAecc − ln πNecc
θ
= lnwAc − lnwNc + (φA − φN)e
+ ln(1− τAecc)− ln(1− τNecc) + ln εAecc − ln εNecc
(3.24)
Abstracting again from the ε terms and under the assumption τAecc = 0, this
equation identifies the cost to enter the non-agricultural sector at home τNecc, given
observed movement flows between the sectors, estimated wage rate differences
and estimated human capital differences. Intuitively, if we observe few people
working in the non-agricultural sector and many people working in agriculture
in a given origin chiefdom c, even after controlling for wage and human capital
differences between the two sectors, this must be driven by some friction to enter
the non-agricultural sector. On average, I estimate a substantial friction. It is
estimated to be 0.4, that is, workers have to forgo 40% of their utility to work in
non-agriculture.25 We can use the estimate of τNecc (and τNedd) to identify τNecd from
the estimate coming out of equation 3.23.26
3.4 Estimation Results
3.4.1 Model Parameters and Validation
Table 3.1 shows the estimated model parameters. The dispersion parameter θ
is estimated to be 4.729. In relation to Bryan & Morten (2019) who estimate
25Put differently, the difference between wages in agriculture and non-agriculture is much
larger than what human capital differences and the sector composition would suggest. In order
to discipline the model to predict a relatively low share of workers in non-agriculture given
the large wage differences, we need a substantial cost to enter that sector. This cost parameter
relates to the literature on the agricultural productivity gap (see for example Gollin et al., 2014;
Hicks et al., 2020; Lagakos et al., 2020; Young, 2014). My estimate of a large friction is broadly
in line with this literature.
26To fix ideas, I have assumed τAecc = 1 ∀c and abstracted from the ε elements which are
random variations with a mean of 1. In fact, what I identify with the described estimation








In some sense, assuming τAecc = 1 ∀c is just a normalization. The weaker assumption we require
is simply that the cost to enter the agricultural sector at home is the same in each location.
Setting it to 1 is simply a normalization. While the friction to enter the non-agricultural sector
relative to agriculture seems plausible (and empirically real), there is no good reason to believe
that there are differential frictions to enter the (default) agricultural sector at home in different
chiefdoms. Regarding the ε terms, as long as they are random with a mean of 1, our expression
above identifies the correct migration cost on average.
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this object as well, I find parameters that compare plausibly to theirs. Their
equivalent estimate of θ is 3.18 for Indonesia and 2.69 for the US. The degree of
productivity dispersion this measures can be interpreted as the degree of similarity
of goods produced in different locations. It would therefore be expected that less
developed countries with a smaller range of varied goods produced would have a
smaller degree of dispersion which is reflected in a higher θ realization.
Table 3.1: Model Parameters
Parameter Description Value Source
θ Fréchet dispersion 4.729 Estimation
φN − φA Difference in education returns 0.247 Estimation
σ Elasticity of substitution 4 Literature
AAd Agricultural firm productivity 0.054 Estimation
ANd Non-agricultural firm productivity 0.113 Estimation
ad Amenities 0.902 Estimation
q0c Avg. individual productivity for uneducated 1.005 Estimation
exp(φN)q1c Avg. individual productivity for educated 1.435 Estimation
τA0cd Migration cost for uneducated in A 0.490 Estimation
τN0cd Migration cost for uneducated in N 0.666 Estimation
τA1cd Migration cost for educated in A 0.406 Estimation
τN1cd Migration cost for educated in N 0.687 Estimation
N0c Origin population of uneducated 1204 Observed
N1c Origin population of educated 425 Observed
Note – Normalizations: ANFreetown = aFreetown = exp(φ
N )q1,Freetown = 1. Parameters θ, φN −
φA and σ are defined at the country level. For all other parameters, the mean at the country
level is reported.
The returns to education estimates show a great differential by sector. This
estimate stems from regression equation 3.20 with log wage as an outcome variable
and can therefore be interpreted as a relative return. Returns to primary school
education in non-agriculture exceed returns to education in agriculture by 25
percentage points.
Considering migration cost by sector and education level, there is a significant
difference by sector. It turns out to be much more costly for people to enter
the non-agricultural sector and move somewhere than the agricultural sector.
Relative to Bryan & Morten (2019) who find 39% migration cost in Indonesia,
I find generally higher migration cost in Sierra Leone. The average across both
education levels and sectors is 56%. Like in their case, I find a strong positive
correlation between my estimate of τ and log distance between two places. Figure
3.3 displays the strong positive relationship with distance which suggests that the
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estimated parameters capture something real about the cost of moving.
Figure 3.3: Migration Cost and Distance
Note – Binscatter of the relationship between migration cost and log distance
between locations. The line is the OLS line of best fit.
Another interesting fact about estimated moving cost is that there is a clear
differential by education level in the agricultural sector. Uneducated people have
to forego 8.4 percentage points more of their income when leaving one’s origin
than educated people in that sector. There is no (strong) differential by education
level in non-agriculture. This could reflect a dissimilarity in crops across space
whereby educated farmers are better able to adapt to different crops. Alterna-
tively, this may also be due to an information barrier or the degree of connections
to other chiefdoms. Educated farmers may be better informed about crops or op-
portunities for agricultural work elsewhere or better connected to farmers away
from home. Since integration into a new chiefdom in Sierra Leone is important
in order to work there, this could be a key driver of the education differential.
The estimates of labor unit wage rates by sector are shown in Figure B5 rela-
tive to the distribution of observed income. In line with the income distribution,
labor unit wage rates in non-agriculture are higher than in agriculture. Interest-
ingly, their variation is also greater. Generally, there is substantial variation in
wage rates. The highest wage rates differ from the lowest wage rates by a factor
of more than ten.
Firm-level productivities vary similarly substantially.27 Average agricultural
27Their distribution by sector is shown in Figure B6.
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firm productivity is 5% of the non-agricultural firm productivity in the capital and
average non-agricultural firm productivity is 11% of non-agricultural firm produc-
tivity in the capital. To assess whether these estimates are capturing something
real about firm productivities in Sierra Leone, I correlate them with observed
variables in the data that could plausibly be related to firm productivities: Ac-
cess to agricultural drying and storage space, connectivity to the electricity grid
and the number of hours electricity is available in a chiefdom. Importantly, these
are variables that are not used anywhere in the estimation strategy. Figure 3.4
demonstrates the result. Agricultural productivity estimates are strongly posi-
tively correlated with access to agricultural drying or storage space. Similarly,
non-agricultural productivity estimates are highly positively correlated with mea-
sures of the existence and extent of electricity connection.
Figure 3.4: Correlates with Firm-level Productivities
Note – Binscatter plots with line of best fit of the relationship between log
(non-)agricultural firm-level productivity lnAAd (lnA
N
d ) and various outcomes
on the x-axis.
In a similar exercise, I consider the estimates of average individual produc-
tivities28 and their relationship with information in the data that could plausibly
capture them but is not used anywhere in the estimation strategy itself. These
parameters are estimated off origin-education fixed effects and essentially cap-
ture the average productivity that people from a certain origin and education
level possess irrespective of which destination they end up living and working in.
Education and the health environment at a young age are arguably important
28Their distribution by education level is shown in Figure B7.
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drivers of such origin productivities. There is indeed a growing literature that
suggests that the state of healthcare at a very young age (in utero or as an in-
fant) can play a very important role for life outcomes.29 Education is explicitly
controlled for, albeit in quite a coarse way, when average individual productiv-
ities are estimated. Therefore, I consider four variables that capture the state
of healthcare at birth in a chiefdom and correlate these with the estimated av-
erage individual productivities as a plausibility check: (i) the probability that a
health professional is present at birth, (ii) how many times antenatal care preg-
nant women receive on average, (iii) the average height of infants, and (iv) the
average height-for-age z score. The results are shown in Figure 3.5. The esti-
mated average individual productivities are clearly positively correlated with all
the four outcomes and significant at conventional levels in most cases.30
Figure 3.5: Correlates with Average Individual Productivities
Note – Binscatter plots with line of best fit of the relationship between log
average individual productivity among the uneducated (educated) ln q0c (ln q1c)
and various outcomes on the x-axis.
Finally, consider the estimates of amenities.31 In a similar exercise as before,
29See for example Almond (2006); Almond & Currie (2011a,b); Maccini & Yang (2009). Since
early-life health shocks can have important long-run implications, the literature analyzing the
effect of conflict on health outcomes typically focuses on health at a very young age as well
(e.g. Akbulut-Yuksel, 2014; Akresh et al., 2012a,b; Bundervoet et al., 2009; Galdo, 2013; Islam
et al., 2016; Kesternich et al., 2014; Saing & Kazianga, 2020). To the extent that the average
individual productivities qec capture the state of health at birth, the estimates of how conflict
affects qec relate to this literature.
30When considering workers today, the relevant education and health environment that may
be a key element of qec is the environment when they were young. Due to lack of accurate
earlier data, however, I still consider the state of healthcare in 2018. For this sense check to
work, the implicit assumption is that there is some stationarity in the state of healthcare within
chiefdoms over time.
31Figure B8 displays the distribution of amenities across space. Compared to wage rates,
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I also test the plausibility of these estimates by correlating them with observed
variables in the data that plausibly reflect amenities. From information on access
to eight public goods and services, I construct two public good indices. In par-
ticular, the public goods indices measure whether the following public goods and
services are within 30 or 60 minute reach: (i) supply of drinking water, (ii) a food
market, (iii) public transportation, (iv) a primary school, (v) a secondary school,
(vi) a health clinic, (vii) a hospital, and (viii) an all year motorable road. I also
consider phone coverage and recharge possibilities within chiefdoms. With all
these measures, amenities are strongly positively correlated as Figure 3.6 shows.
Figure 3.6: Correlates with Amenities
Note – Binscatter plots with line of best fit of the relationship between log
amenities ln ad and various outcomes on the x-axis. The public good index is
the average of eight binary variables indicating whether the following public
goods/services are within 30 (60) minutes reach: (i) supply of drinking water,
(ii) food market, (iii) public transportation, (iv) primary school, (v) secondary
school, (vi) health clinic, (vii) hospital, (viii) all year motorable road
3.4.2 Conflict Effect on Parameters
With these parameter estimates in hand, we can proceed to estimate the im-
pact of conflict on firm productivities, location amenities and average individual
productivities directly. For this exercise, I need to take a stance on the specific
relationship between conflict and the parameters of the model. For all relevant
continuous parameters of the model parc ∈ {AAc , ANc , ac, q0c, q1c}, I assume a log-
firm-level productivities and average individual productivities, amenities vary considerably less
across space. Relative to the capital Freetown, average amenities are 13% smaller.
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linear relationship between the current parameter value and conflict:
ln parc = ln parc + η conflictc (3.26)
where parc is today’s counterfactual value of the parameter in the absence of
conflict and c is a chiefdom index. In this relationship, η captures the long-run
(semi-)elasticity of the key parameters of the economy with respect to conflict and
subsequently determines to what extent conflict persistently affects the economy
as discussed in section 3.2.2. For the primary education outcome e, I assume that
the probability to be educated is linearly affected by conflict. At the chiefdom
level, denoting the share of primary educated individuals by ec, the above rela-
tionship holds in levels, that is, the outcome is ec and the counterfactual value
ec.
In order to simulate what the economy would look like today, we are interested
in finding the counterfactual firm productivities, amenities and average individual
productivities. If the elasticities η can be estimated, an estimate of the counter-
factual values would simply be given by their current value minus the estimated
effect of conflict:
ln p̂arc = ln parc − η̂ conflictc (3.27)
Essentially, we would reverse the effect of conflict on the parameters. For this
calculation, we need to estimate η. Returning to equation 3.26, let us assume
that the counterfactual parameter values ln parc are made up of some observable
and unobservable characteristics of chiefdoms. Using the same observable char-
acteristics as in the reduced-form estimation in section 2.3.2, equation 3.26 can
be rewritten as a regression equation:
ln parc = αdistrict + Xc
′µ+ η conflictc + uc (3.28)
This equation can be estimated for all parameters of interestAAc , ANc , ac, q0c, q1c
(and the equivalent level version for ec). However, since conflict variation is not
exogenous, a simple OLS regression would yield inconsistent results. In partic-
ular, the reduced-form results from section 2.4 suggest that conflict intensity is
higher in places that have higher income to begin with since the OLS results are
considerably weaker than the IV results. In the context of the model, higher
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initial income in locations that experience conflict is plausibly related to better
parameter values, e.g. larger productivity of firms, in such places before the war.
Therefore, when investigating the effect of conflict on firm productivities, a simple
OLS estimate would suffer from selection bias.
However, I can employ the same IV identification strategy as in the reduced-
form analysis. Using distance to the Liberian border as an instrument for conflict
intensity, I can identify the elasticity of firm productivities, amenities and average
individual productivities with respect to conflict. Table 3.2 shows the results at
the chiefdom level.32
Table 3.2: Effect of Conflict on Model Parameters
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lnAAc lnA
N
c ln ac ec ln q0c ln q1c
Conflict -0.0290 -0.284 0.00470 -0.0690∗∗ -0.122∗ -0.0314
(0.143) (0.260) (0.00596) (0.0316) (0.0734) (0.0811)
N 150 138 151 151 151 151
R2 0.526 0.745 0.824 0.803 0.465 0.432
Estimation Method IV IV IV IV IV IV
First Stage F (KP) 18.71 22.52 18.91 17.23 17.23 17.23
AR p-value 0.929 0.367 0.149 0.032 0.088 0.576
Socio-econ. Controls X X X X X X
District FE X X X X X X
Note – Outcome variables at the chiefdom level: Log firm-level productivity in agriculture and non-
agriculture, log amenities, share of primary school educated people and log average individual produc-
tivity for uneducated and educated. Conflict standardized and instrumented with distance to border.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors at the chiefdom level in parentheses. Kleibergen-Paap ro-
bust F statistic and p-value for weak instrument robust Anderson-Rubin test of H0 : β = 0 reported.
Stars refer to standard t-tests. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The effect of conflict on agricultural firm productivity (column 1), amenities
(column 3) and average individual productivity among the educated (column 6)
is small and insignificant.33 By contrast, there is a clear and strong negative
impact on average individual productivity for the uneducated q0c. The estimate
suggests that a one standard deviation increase in conflict intensity leads to a
reduction in average individual productivity draws of uneducated people born in
32Some firm productivities cannot be estimated since no one actually works in that sector and
destination. Hence, we do not have any income information for those sector-destinations. This
applies to one location in agriculture and 13 locations in non-agriculture. These chiefdoms are
excluded from the analysis of firm productivities here. In the simulations, the firm productivity
for those sector-destinations is set equal to zero to rationalize no worker choosing them.
33While q1c for the educated cannot be identified separately from the human capital term
exp(φS) this does not matter in the log-level relationship between parameters and conflict. The
human capital term is constant at the country level and enters additively in the logarithmic
expression. Thus, it shows up in the constant term and does not change the slope coefficient of
interest reported here.
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the affected location by 12.2%. The fact that the uneducated seem to be affected
while the educated are not may reflect that educated workers are better able to
deal with the conflict shock in terms of their individual productivity. They may
have had access to better opportunities for recovery and (re)training after the
war than the uneducated.
The estimate on average education at the chiefdom level also suggests a strong
effect. Across all people born in a particular chiefdom, the share of people obtain-
ing primary school education goes down by 6.9 percentage points as the chiefdom
experiences one more standard deviation of conflict.34 The results further suggest
that there is a very large effect on non-agricultural firm productivity (column 2).
Firm productivities in that sector decrease by 28.4% as locations experience an
increase in conflict intensity by one standard deviation. While the latter esti-
mate is not significant at any conventional level, given its non-trivial size and
a potentially imprecise IV estimation on the limited sample of 138 chiefdoms, I
am cautious not to simply dismiss this result as a zero effect. In the following
section, I provide counterfactual simulations both with and without considering
effects on non-agricultural firm productivity. On the basis of some results arising
in these different scenarios, I will discuss why I consider a real effect of conflict
on non-agricultural firm productivity indeed plausible.
3.5 Counterfactual Simulations
Drawing on the estimated model parameters and their elasticity with conflict, I
can perform counterfactual simulations.35 These simulations serve two purposes.
First, by simulating away the conflict in the whole economy, I can generate a
true counterfactual of what the entire Sierra Leonean economy would look like
today in the absence of civil war. This allows for the estimation of aggregate
34Note that this estimate differs from the estimate presented in the reduced-form analysis.
The reason is twofold. First, this analysis is carried out at the chiefdom level whereby chiefdom
averages of control variables that vary across individuals are used. This implies that individual
and chiefdom-level regressions do not mechanically generate the same result. Second, and
more importantly, the result presented here considers the share of primary educated people in
origin chiefdoms. The implicit timing assumption of the model is that people obtain education
before moving (see section 3.2.2). To assess the effect of conflict on education before sector and
destination choices are made therefore requires considering origin chiefdoms. By contrast, the
reduced-form analysis compares education outcomes of workers across destinations. The fact
that education differences across destinations with differing conflict intensity is greater than
differences across origin chiefdoms speaks in favor of the kind of selective migration discussed
in further detail in section 3.5.2: Educated people are leaving conflict locations at a higher rate
than the uneducated.
35On a technical level, the model is solved numerically using the iterative procedure described
in Appendix E.
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effects. Second, by considering the effects that conflict has on the different pa-
rameters of the model separately, simulations allow me to make an assessment of
the quantitative importance of different mechanisms.
In order to generate a no-war counterfactual of the Sierra Leonean economy,
the first simulation reverts all effects that the war has on model parameters. I
identify three such effects: first, a reduction in education, second, a decrease in
firm productivity in the non-agricultural sector, and third, a reduction in average
individual productivity among the uneducated. The IV estimates inform the size
of the conflict effect.36 By reverting the effect of the war, chiefdoms that expe-
rienced conflict have a larger educated population, greater non-agricultural firm
productivity and higher average individual productivity for uneducated people
born in that chiefdom in the simulated peace counterfactual.
Unlike a partial equilibrium exercise in which everything else is kept constant,
the simulation generates a new counterfactual in general equilibrium. The model
traces through both the direct implications of these parameter changes for aggre-
gate income as well as the indirect implications by changing the allocation of labor
across sectors and space. In theory, changes in non-agricultural firm productivi-
ties, education and average individual productivities among the uneducated have
different implications for the sectoral and spatial distribution of labor that I con-
sider in turn. First, through their strong direct relationship with non-agricultural
wages, lower non-agricultural firm productivities in affected chiefdoms lead to an
outflow of non-agricultural workers into the agricultural sector and other chief-
doms.
Second, with higher returns to education in sector N than A, a less educated
workforce is a greater harm to the non-agricultural sector. This implies that
education losses also translate into a shift into agriculture. A counterforce to
this effect is a general equilibrium effect through prices. Since human capital is
harmed more in the non-agricultural sector as a result of education losses, the
workforce in that sector becomes relatively less productive. In general equilib-
rium, a less productive workforce in a sector implies higher prices and wages. This
is essentially a demand channel. Since people demand all local goods produced
in the whole economy, a workforce productivity shock implies that more workers
36Figure B9 displays how this scenario changes the underlying distribution of educated origin
populations, non-agricultural firm productivity and average individual productivity among the
uneducated.
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are needed to produce the same amount of the good. This results in an increase
in wages and prices and subsequently an inflow of workers into the sector. Em-
pirically, the former direct effect dominates the general equilibrium channel such
that affected chiefdoms experience a growth in the agricultural labor force.37
In terms of migration, the same general equilibrium effect as discussed above
would encourage workers in locations that experience education losses to stay
and migrants to flow in with higher wages. Similarly, larger moving cost for
uneducated workers in agriculture leads to more stayers in such chiefdoms.
Third, a reduction in average individual productivities among the uneducated
only has a general equilibrium effect through prices and wages. Conceptually, the
effect is the same as the general equilibrium effect of human capital changes de-
scribed above. As the workforce is less productive in a particular sector and
location, wage rates increase which leads to an inflow of workers into that sec-
tor and location. Since uneducated workers tend to work in the agricultural
sector, the agricultural sector is affected by a drop in average individual produc-
tivity among the uneducated to a larger extent than the non-agricultural sector.
Therefore, such a reduction in individual productivity leads to more agricultural
workers staying and more in-migration into affected locations, in particular in
agriculture.
Having simulated a peace economy by reverting the effect of conflict on all
affected parameters, a second set of simulations serves the purpose of assessing
different mechanisms. To this end, relative to the peace economy, I simulate three
different partial war scenarios. First, I simulate an effect on non-agricultural
firm productivity only. Second, I simulate an effect on education only. Third, I
simulate an effect on average individual productivity among the uneducated only.
3.5.1 Main Results
The results for the first simulation are generated by comparing the (baseline cal-
ibrated) war economy to the (simulated) peace economy. The results on separate
37Note that this human capital effect at the individual level is conceptually distinct from the
firm productivity effect. Formally, the difference can be seen in equation 3.16 that characterizes
the equilibrium of the economy. Through perfect competition which governs that prices equal
marginal cost, a firm productivity decrease in sector N (ANd going down) leads to a strong
direct effect on wage rates since firm productivity reductions increase marginal cost. The
human capital effect is a change in labor supply LNd . The negative relationship between wage
rates wNd and labor supply in the same sector and location L
N
d shown in the equation reflects
the general equilibrium effect described.
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mechanisms are generated by comparing the (simulated) peace economy to (sim-
ulated) partial war scenarios. Figures 3.7 and 3.8 display the results for aggregate
income and the aggregate employment share in agriculture.






















Note – Changes in aggregate income in four simulations relative to the peace econ-
omy: Full conflict effect on education, firm productivities and average individual
productivities (blue), only an effect of conflict on firm productivities (red), only an
effect of conflict on education (grey), only an effect of conflict on average individual
productivities (green)
The first result to note is that the aggregate income effect of conflict is sub-
stantial. Income today is almost 32% lower today than it would be in the absence
of the war. With lower pay in agriculture, an aggregate sector shift seems to be an
important driver of this result. The economy-wide share of people in agriculture
is almost 21 percentage points higher.38
Beyond the total effect, the next three simulation results highlight the relative
importance of different mechanisms. If conflict only affected non-agricultural firm
productivities but left education and average individual productivities unchanged,
the income loss would be almost 18%. Similarly, if it only affected education or
average individual productivities, the income losses would be 3.7% or 10.5%,
respectively. This highlights that a drop in non-agricultural firm productivity is
the most important driver of a long-run impact of civil war on the Sierra Leonean
economy.
The results are in sharp contrast to the attention firms and business activity
38These results mask substantial heterogeneity. Considering the full reversal of the war,
Figure B10 displays the aggregate income changes in each chiefdom with the largest losers
experiencing a 64% reductions in income.
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Note – Changes in aggregate employment share in agriculture in four simulations rel-
ative to the peace economy: Full conflict effect on education, firm productivities and
average individual productivities (blue), only an effect of conflict on firm productivi-
ties (red), only an effect of conflict on education (grey), only an effect of conflict on
average individual productivities (green)
receive in the analysis of consequences of conflict in the literature, in particular
relative to the amount of analyses considering education as a mechanism. Yet, in
the case of Sierra Leone, the education effect of conflict alone can only account
for a small part of the full conflict effect. Even along with other individual pro-
ductivity losses such as health that would be captured in the parameter estimate
q0c, firm productivity losses remain the most important pathway of the conflict
impact on the economy.
It is noteworthy that there do not seem to be important complementarities
between the three mechanisms. The income effects from the three separate simu-
lations by mechanism almost perfectly add up to the simulation which considers
all of them jointly.
Interpreted more broadly, the difference between the effect driven by firm and
average individual productivities including human capital capture essentially the
difference between destination and origin productivities. In the data, the pa-
rameters ASd and qec exp(φSe) are estimated off destination(-sector) and origin(-
education) fixed effects of income, after controlling for selection.39 Following
39This is a slightly simplified characterization of how firm productivities ASd are estimated.
As section 3.3.3 explains in detail, the destination-sector fixed effects actually only identify
wage rates wSd and the estimation of A
S
d makes use of these wage rate estimates along with the
general equilibrium conditions of the model. However, since there is a strong direct relationship
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this interpretation, the results imply the following. As a result of civil war, af-
fected locations in Sierra Leone suffer from a location-level productivity decrease.
Everyone who chooses to live in these locations (destinations) experiences this
productivity reduction, regardless of where they are from. At the same time,
individuals who are from locations where war took place suffer in their individual
productivity by virtue of being born or growing up in conflict affected (origin)
locations. No matter where they move, they carry this productivity loss with
them. Both types of productivity effects have sizeable consequences for aggre-
gate productivity. In relation to each other, the destination productivity effect is
somewhat more important.
The results on the aggregate agricultural employment share for the three simu-
lations by mechanism differ drastically. A sector shift seems to be almost entirely
driven by reductions in non-agricultural firm productivity. Relative to that, ed-
ucation losses or average individual productivity decreases play a negligible role
for the sector shift.
Given the large size of the sector shift in the reduced form, these results
strongly suggest that the effect of conflict on non-agricultural firm productivity
is real. In the absence of it, a sector shift in the aggregate can basically not be
generated by the model. As discussed previously, the reduced-form results only
identify a spatial difference and may partially capture spatial divergence between
more and less affected chiefdoms by conflict. However, for the reduced-form re-
sults and the (aggregate) simulation results to be consistent in the absence of an
effect of conflict on ANd , it would need to be true that there is an extreme degree of
sector sorting across space in response to conflict without a meaningful aggregate
change in the (total) number of agricultural workers. The reduced-form estimate
suggests that a chiefdom experiencing high conflict (at the 75th percentile of the
conflict intensity distribution) has 23 percentage point more agricultural workers
than a chiefdom experiencing low conflict (at the 25th percentile). Therefore, this
spatial difference would have to be almost entirely driven by agricultural work-
ers sorting into high conflict locations and non-agricultural workers sorting into
low conflict locations with only a slight change in the total share of agricultural
workers. Even with large migration flows, this seems implausible. It is much
between wage rates wSd and firm productivities A
S
d in general equilibrium, it turns out that the
estimates of the latter do not drastically differ from the former. To fix ideas, it is therefore a
fair approximation to think of ASd estimates as destination-sector fixed effects.
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more plausible that the total number of agricultural workers increases as a result
of civil war and this contributes to a spatial difference in agricultural workers
between high and low conflict chiefdoms. This is the case in the first simulation
that takes into account an effect of conflict on non-agricultural firm productivity
which gives rise to a strong increase in the aggregate share of agricultural workers
by 18.3 percentage points.
3.5.2 Selective Migration
While the aggregate income effect of civil war is sizeable, it is substantially smaller
than what the reduced-form estimates would suggest. If we were to take the
reduced-form estimate and calculate a country-wide weighted average by conflict
intensity and chiefdom population we would arrive at a 46% aggregate income
loss. The fact that spatial income differences markedly exceed the aggregate
income difference suggests that selective migration in response to conflict matters
a great deal.
In order to get a sense of the potential importance of migration, I simulate an
economy without labor mobility. In particular, relative to the peace economy, the
full conflict scenario can be simulated without allowing labor movement.40 The
results of this simulation are shown in Figure 3.9. The aggregate income effect in
this simulation is a 53% reduction which is dramatically different from the 32%
reduction in the economy with labor mobility. This suggests that migration plays
a large role for the aggregate effect of the war and cannot be ignored when ana-
lyzing the consequences of conflict. In particular, it is plausible that a migration
response to the civil war in Sierra Leone implies that the spatial income difference
between more and less affected chiefdoms is large relative to the aggregate income
effect of the war. Positive selection out of conflict zones would generate such a
result.
It is therefore worth considering the nature of this migration response. The full
conflict scenario actually fails to generate a correlation between conflict intensity
and population change in a chiefdom.41 Table 3.3 shows the result in column (2).
The coefficient is very close to zero and insignificant. Interestingly, this slope
40On a technical level, this is implemented by setting the cost of migration equal to 1, that
is, a mover would keep 0% of their income. In equilibrium, no one moves.
41This result is in line with Davis & Weinstein (2002) who find that population densities of
Japanese cities are unaffected by bombing in the long run.
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Note – Changes in aggregate income in two simulations and in the reduced form. The
first simulation corresponds to the original full conflict scenario above. The second
simulation implements a full conflict scenario without labor mobility.
coefficient is extremely similar to the relationship that can actually be observed
in the data. Column (1) shows the result of a regression of conflict changes
between 1985 before the war and 2015 after the war on conflict.
By contrast, a conflict simulation that does not account for an effect on
non-agricultural firm productivity generates a markedly different result. Albeit
marginally insignificant (p = 0.128), the coefficient for the same relationship be-
tween population change and conflict intensity in that scenario is strongly positive
(column 3).42 The fact that the relationship between population change and con-
flict intensity in the data is much better matched in the full conflict scenario is
another piece of support for taking the effect of conflict on non-agricultural firm
productivity seriously.
While the first simulation including a non-agricultural firm productivity effect
suggests that the migration flows are unaffected by the war, it does not speak to
the composition of movers that may change as a result of the war. Three facts
that come from the parameter estimates would indeed indicate that the selection
of migrants out of conflict zones changes with conflict in a way that out-migrants
42Note that this coefficient is an economically meaningful effect. It means that a one stan-
dard deviation increase in conflict implies population growth by almost 1%. The sign of the
relationship is perfectly in line with the labor movement response to education and average
individual productivity changes discussed above. Larger movement cost for the uneducated in
agriculture and a general equilibrium effect through prices and wages gives rise to population
growth in chiefdoms that are more heavily affected by conflict.
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are more positively selected on productivity grounds. First, the strong reduc-
tion in non-agricultural firm productivity leads non-agricultural workers who are
typically more productive and educated than agricultural workers to leave.
Second, more affected chiefdoms by conflict have a larger uneducated work-
force. Uneducated workers tend to work in agriculture and migration cost is
larger for uneducated agricultural workers. This implies that there are more un-
educated agricultural workers who tend to be less productive among the stayers.
These two effects can be interpreted as conflict opening up a local poverty trap.
It leads to lower education and pushes more people into agriculture while it is
relatively harder for those people to leave.
Third, the general equilibrium implication of lower average individual produc-
tivity among the uneducated implies higher wages, in particular in the agricultural
sector that employs more uneducated workers. This is another selection mecha-
nism that leads to more uneducated workers among the stayers in high conflict
chiefdoms.
Table 3.3: Population Change and Conflict
Population Change
(1) (2) (3)
Conflict -0.0349 -0.030 0.855
(0.0439) (0.730) (0.558)
Constant 0.681∗∗∗ 0.310 0.375
(0.0436) (0.713) (0.545)
Source Data Full Conflict Simulation w/o
Simulation ANd Effect
N 151 151 151
R2 0.00423 0.000 0.015
Note – Outcome variable: Population change in %. Conflict
measure standardized. First column: Relationship in the data.
Population change is measured between 2015 and 1985. Second
column: Relationship from simulated data. Population change is
the relative difference between the simulated peace economy and
baseline calibrated war economy. Third column: Relationship
from simulated data. Population change is the relative difference
between the simulated peace economy and a simulated war econ-
omy whereby the simulation only takes into account the effect of
conflict on education and average individual productivity among
the uneducated. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
3.5.3 Limitations
There are four limitations to this analysis that qualify the results. First, the
identification of aggregate effects implicitly assumes that some chiefdoms are
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not at all affected by the war. The identification of how conflict affects key
parameters of the model rests on within-country comparisons of chiefdoms that
are closer to or farther from the Liberian border and therefore experience conflict
to varying degrees. In the counterfactual analysis, chiefdoms that are very far
from the border with a zero realization on the conflict measure are assumed not
to experience any effect of civil war. If those chiefdoms also suffer in some way
from the war, my estimates would be an underestimate of the true aggregate
effect.
Second, the estimate captures the net effect of civil war in the long run af-
ter post-conflict interventions between the end of the war and 2018. Since the
international community was engaged in reconstruction work after the war, the
aggregate effects I present are not the pure effect of civil war but rather how the
economy still suffers after taking into account reconstruction efforts. The pure
effect of the war would therefore be weakly greater than my estimate.43
Third, if one were to relax the assumption of costlessly tradable goods across
space, the actual effect of conflict on firm productivities may be smaller and
my aggregate income effect thus overestimated. With trade cost, my estimates
of firm productivities would capture a combination of these productivities and
market access of a location. Market access is the weighted sum of all other
locations’ real GDP where the weights are inverse trade cost (cf. equation D1 in
Appendix D.1). Part of the conflict effect on firm productivities that I estimate
could stem from a reduction in market access. If market access is lower because
trade cost increased as a result of the war, my estimate of the aggregate income
effect is not necessarily different but the mechanisms driving this result are –
part of the effect would be due to increased trade cost rather than reduced firm
productivity. However, if market access is lower because economic performance
43Another potential concern surrounding reconstruction is spatially asymmetric reconstruc-
tion that favors certain areas over others depending on their ties to the post-war government.
If the extent to which chiefdoms potentially get favorable treatment is systematically related
to distance to the Liberian border, this could lead to bias in the estimates of the conflict effect
on parameters such as firm productivities which feed into the simulation results. The estimates
would capture the effect of the war and the extent of patronage towards certain areas. While
it is hard to find evidence on how and where reconstruction took place, existing writings and
critiques of post-war reconstruction efforts do not seem to comment on any patronage with
implications for the spatial distribution of reconstruction activities. Two important post-war
policies and institutional changes were the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
(DDR) program and the decentralization process that involved the reinstatement of local coun-
cils at the district level. Both were rolled out in and inherently affected the whole country.
While being criticized on a number of grounds such as failing to achieve reintegration of fight-
ers or limited progress in establishing good governance at the local level, there is typically no
mention of geographic favoritism in the implementation of these programs (e.g. Sesay & Suma,
2009; Solomon & Ginifer, 2008; Zhou, 2009).
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in close chiefdoms with low trade cost contracted, this contraction should not be
loaded on a reduction in the firm productivity parameter. As a result, the actual
effect on firm productivities would be less pronounced and the aggregate income
effect would be smaller. However, the market access term would contaminate the
firm productivity estimates for both agriculture and non-agriculture. Since I do
not find any effect of conflict on agricultural firm productivity it is unlikely that
the latter channel plays a major role. Therefore, any potential upward bias from
assuming free trade across chiefdoms is likely to be small.
Fourth, the simulation results depend on the size of the elasticity of substi-
tution σ. However, both the aggregate income and aggregate sector results are
reasonably robust to different values of σ. Figures B11 and B12 show the aggre-
gate income and sector shift changes for alternative σ values of 6 and 8. These
alternative values reflect that the relevant literature uses values between 4 and
8.44 Both the sector shift and aggregate income effect are stronger for higher val-
ues of σ. This is intuitive since the elasticity of substitution governs the trade-off
between two competing effects of productivity changes on the sector allocation.
As productivity in sector N decreases relative to sector A, the non-agricultural
good gets more expensive which leads to lower demand. Hence, production in
that sector goes down. At the same time, lower productivity implies that the
labor input needed to produce a given amount is larger. The elasticity of sub-
stitution determines the strength of the first effect. The larger the elasticity, the
stronger the substitution effect and the more people shift sector to accommodate
changing demand.45
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter investigates the general equilibrium impact of civil war in Sierra
Leone. To this end, I develop an economic geography model. To keep track of
population movement and its general equilibrium implications in response to the
war, labor mobility under migration cost is a key feature of the model. Besides
44See a brief discussion in section 3.3.3.
45As long as the σ > 1, the first effect always dominates the second effect and the precise
value of σ just determines the extent to which it does. Hence, the result on the sector shift
only change quantitatively. If σ < 1, the first effect is weaker than the second effect and a
productivity decrease in sector N implies more people working in that sector. This is indeed
Baumol’s cost disease argument and shown formally in Ngai & Pissarides (2007). However,
empirically, the relevant literature for the elasticity of substitution used in my context suggests
values that are considerably larger than 1.
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their destination, individuals choose their sector of work subject to an individual
productivity draw and firm productivities for each sector and destination. Since
returns to education are sector-specific, their education realization also shapes this
decision. Conflict can change education, firm productivities, average individual
productivities and amenities. This affects aggregate income both directly and
indirectly by changing the sector composition and spatial allocation of labor.
The key parameters of the model can be estimated in a simple recursive proce-
dure. In particular, observed income and migration flows identify firm productiv-
ities, average individual productivities as well as location amenities. Education
outcomes are directly observed in the data. Having estimated all parameters,
I can assess the effect of conflict on education, firm productivities, average in-
dividual productivities and amenities. I find that education, average individual
productivity among the uneducated and firm productivity in the non-agricultural
sector are persistently and strongly affected by the war while amenities, agricul-
tural firm productivity and average individual productivity among the educated
are not.
Finally, these results can be taken forward for counterfactual simulations of
the Sierra Leonean economy in the absence of the war. A full reversal of the war
scenario involves reverting the human capital loss, non-agricultural firm produc-
tivity drop and reductions in average individual productivity among the uned-
ucated. Comparing this simulation to the observed economy that experienced
civil war, I find that Sierra Leonean aggregate income is 31.6% lower today and
the economy-wide share of workers in agriculture 20.8 percentage points higher
as a result of the war. Running conflict simulations in which I consider the effect
on education, firm productivities and average individual productivities separately
allows me to assess the quantitative importance of these different mechanisms.
Firm productivity losses can account for the largest part of aggregate income
reductions with income decreasing by 17.8% due to this mechanism alone. By
contrast, while having received much more attention as a mechanism, the impact
of conflict on education alone would only lead to a 3.7% reduction in aggregate
income. Identifying exactly the relevant elements for firm productivity that are
potential drivers behind this and using a similar model structure to learn about
the aggregate effect and mechanisms of conflict impact in other settings are left
as promising avenues for future research.
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Chapter 4
The Impact of Peace: Evidence
from Nigeria
4.1 Introduction
This chapter exploits a regional peace policy in Nigeria to shed light on conse-
quences of conflict. Specifically, I ask two questions. First, does peace follow
the policy in the Niger Delta region where it was carried out? Second, hav-
ing established peace, what is the impact of it on overall economic performance,
self-employment income and education?
The two key contributions of this analysis are the following. First, on the
mechanisms front, while the link between conflict and business activity has re-
ceived little attention so far, I highlight that this can be an important channel.
Indeed, my quantitatively strongest result establishes that there is a large peace
dividend1 for the self-employed. Second, and methodologically, I employ the syn-
thetic control method (SCM) in my evaluation. The method was developed by
Abadie & Gardeazabal (2003) in the analysis of conflict on economic performance
in the Basque Country in Spain. It has since been used rarely in similar eval-
uations but this is the first study, to the best of my knowledge, to apply it in
the analysis of other outcomes than overall economic performance. This is an
important advancement in the literature on the mechanisms of a conflict impact
because the method can overcome common pitfalls of alternatively used method-
1The term “peace dividend” is used in the literature to refer either generally to benefits
of newly established peace or, in a different and much more specific context, the potential
gains generated by shifting government resources from military expenditures to other uses.
Henceforth, I refer to the first notion when using the expression.
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ologies. In particular, the commonly used DID approach requires a parallel trend
between areas affected by conflict and those that are not. Using data during and
after the conflict in Nigeria, I can show that this assumption is violated in my
context.
The peace policy analyzed in this study is the Presidential Amnesty Program
(PAP) that the Nigerian government implemented in the southeastern Niger Delta
region in 2009. The program was a response to resistance activism in the region
which turned violent in 2006 and escalated into intense conflict within a few
years. In the context of the amnesty program, ex-militants were granted pardon
and joined a “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration” (DDR) program
in return for surrendering their weapons. In a first step, I document that a period
of peace follows the program in the Niger Delta region for at least four years.2
Along with the fact that other parts of Nigeria experience conflict between
2009 and 2013, this provides a unique quasi-experimental setting for the second
and main step of my analysis: Estimating the benefits of peace. The empirical
strategy is to create a synthetic control region as a weighted average of other
states outside the Niger Delta region. The weights are chosen in a way that the
synthetic control region resembles the Niger Delta region in all outcome variables
closely before the policy is put in place. Serving as a counterfactual, this allows
me to estimate the peace dividend by simply comparing the Niger Delta region
and its synthetic control region four years later.
As a measure of the overall economic performance, I consider household ex-
penditures. To shed light on some mechanisms that could potentially drive an
effect on economic performance in the medium or long run, I also consider edu-
cation and self-employment income as outcome variables. While education has
received a lot of attention in the literature already, there is, to the best of my
2While such a simple time series analysis does not conclusively prove that peace can (only)
be attributed to the amnesty program implemented, it would certainly strongly suggest that
the policy had a role to play. In any case, for my main analysis of the economic benefits of
peace, documenting a period of peace between 2009 and 2013 is sufficient, no matter whether
it was (fully) due to the peace policy or not. Indeed, the success of demobilization programs
is far from guaranteed. Some papers on such programs in particular (D’Aoust et al., 2018;
Gilligan et al., 2012; Humphreys & Weinstein, 2007) or the link between development programs
and conflict more generally (Beath et al., 2011; Berman et al., 2013, 2011; Crost et al., 2014,
2016) deliver ambiguous results. Both for repeat violence and economic outcomes, positive,
zero and negative effects are found in the literature. The only common theme that seems to
emerge to some extent, elaborated on both theoretically and empirically particularly in Berman
et al. (2011), is that locally specific programs tend to have a higher probability of success. As
opposed to the national DDR programs discussed in the literature, the one I consider is carried
out only in the Niger Delta region and in this sense somewhat more local. My finding of
conflict reduction in the region following the policy broadly fits within the emerging theme of
local success.
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knowledge, only one study that analyzes self-employment income as an outcome
of conflict (Velásquez, 2020). Yet, the effect I find for this outcome is the largest
one among the three outcomes.
My main findings on economic outcomes are that peace increases household
expenditures at the median by 19%, generates 0.5 more years of schooling on
average and increases self-employment income at the median by 67% four years
later. These results are robust to the alternative DID specification for education
where the parallel trend assumption holds and deviate from the specification
exactly in the direction of the parallel trend deviation where said assumption
is violated. I provide further robustness against migration driving this result
in an analysis concerning potential spillover effects from population movement.
As a general caveat, however, it is worth noting that my standard errors and
other measures imply that there is a substantial degree of uncertainty around my
average effects, so that none of my findings should be taken as very precise point
estimates.
The effect on household expenditures is indeed large but consistent with most
closely comparable studies that evaluate the impact of conflict using the synthetic
control method in other contexts (Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2003; Dorsett, 2013;
Gong & Rao, 2016; Matta et al., 2016). More broadly, the result is also in line
with an (older) macroeconomic literature that establishes a negative link between
conflict experience and economic performance, at least in the short and medium
run (Alesina & Perotti, 1996; Barro, 1991; Cerra & Saxena, 2008; Collier, 1999).3
An important driver of increased economic prosperity as a result of peace
seems to be improved (small) business activity in the Niger Delta region. As
the Niger Delta is an oil-rich region, it may however be plausible to have such
large effects. With oil production picking up as a consequence of peace (Walls &
During, 2020), not only will small businesses surrounding the oil industry benefit,
but also all other kinds of businesses that use oil or derivative products as key
inputs.
3To what extent such effects persist in the long run or whether there is convergence in line
with the logic of the Solow model is not clear. While some estimates suggest there is convergence,
other studies find evidence for the opposite. In particular, some direct evidence on GDP (Chen
et al., 2008; Gates et al., 2012; Miguel & Roland, 2011) and on city size (Brakman et al.,
2004; Davis & Weinstein, 2002) suggest convergence. By contrast, other direct evidence on
GDP (Akbulut-Yuksel, 2014; Galdo, 2013; Islam et al., 2016) find no convergence. The below
mentioned range of studies on education outcomes that should affect economic performance
according to standard theory would also suggest that there is no convergence, at least not
within a lifetime of those affected by conflict.
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There are only few studies that analyze the effect of peace or conflict on
business activity (Bozzoli et al., 2012; Camacho & Rodriguez, 2013; Collier &
Duponchel, 2013; Deininger, 2003; Velásquez, 2020). This is partly owed to the
problem of identification. Existing papers almost exclusively employ time and
conflict variation for identification which requires both pre- and post-conflict ob-
servations. In particular for longer conflicts, this is a non-trivial data require-
ment.4 With the exception of Velásquez (2020), all studies consider the extensive
margin only and find that conflict reduces the probability of running a business.
Using average self-employment income allows me to capture both the extensive
and intensive margin of (small) business activity. On the extensive margin, it
captures the extent to which more productive business owners enter the market
in a more conducive environment of peace as well as how their entry may induce
more competition which crowds out low-productivity competitors and engenders
higher average income in more productive businesses. On the intensive margin,
it captures the extent to which already existing business owners increase their
business activity. Another important contribution is expanding the methodolog-
ical portfolio. This study is the first one to use the synthetic control method for
the analysis of business outcomes.
With regards to the effect of conflict on education, the majority of papers em-
ploys a DID approach that exploits school age (cohort) variation and geographic
conflict variation within a country (Akbulut-Yuksel, 2014; Akresh & De Walque,
2011; Chamarbagwala & Morán, 2011; Islam et al., 2016; Kesternich et al., 2014;
Leon, 2012; Márquez-Padilla et al., 2015; Merrouche, 2011; Pivovarova & Swee,
2015; Saing et al., 2017; Shemyakina, 2011; Swee, 2015; Valente, 2014).5 In light
of the fact that the DID approach is predominantly used, it is not clear whether
many of these studies suffer from systematic bias arising because of a potential
violation of the parallel trend assumption or spillover effects. Using cohort varia-
tion, the parallel trend assumption would be violated if control cohorts in conflict
areas are affected by conflict as well. Indeed, some studies that focus on primary
education take younger people (older than 16 or 18) who could still reasonably
4Collier & Duponchel (2013) only have post-conflict data in their analysis of firm activity in
Sierra Leone and make use of an instrument for identification. However, instrumental variable
estimation strategies require a valid instrument for conflict which is typically hard to find as
well.
5A notable exception is Blattman & Annan (2010) who can make use of a quasi-experimental
setting with plausibly random “recruitment” abductions by rebels in Uganda.
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be in secondary or tertiary education as control cohorts although they might also
suffer in their educational outcomes as a result of the war.
I address both issues by using the synthetic control method and delivering
robustness checks against relevant spillover effects, in particular around migra-
tion. Unlike the cohort variation used in DID approaches, the synthetic control
procedure in my setting exploits pre- and post-peace data. The fact that I use
the variation in actual time periods covering both conflict and peace enables me
to much more clearly test the pre-trend on years before the peace-generating
amnesty policy.6 The fact that I find an effect that is broadly in line with the
set of estimates found in the literature, ranging between a 0.2 and 1 year loss of
schooling as a result of conflict, provides further credibility to a strong effect of
conflict on education. This is an important finding because it speaks in favor of
a long-run effect of conflict on life outcomes such as earnings through the human
capital channel.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides some
contextual background to the Niger Delta amnesty policy, section 4.3 informally
explores potential theoretical channels involved in the consequences of conflict
for education, self-employment income and household expenditures while section
4.4 describes the data. Section 4.5 explains and discusses the empirical design of
my study in more detail, section 4.6 presents the results and section 4.7 delivers
some relevant robustness checks. Finally, section 4.8 concludes.
4.2 Context
After independence from the British in 1960, a civil war in the late 1960s and
almost thirty years of military rule following the civil war, Nigeria has been un-
der the rule of democratically elected governments and presidents since 1999.
However, different parts of Nigeria have still experienced various degrees of con-
flict after democratization. A particularly important region of Nigeria where this
happened is the Niger Delta region.
This region is an oil rich region in the southeastern part of Nigeria. Since
6Few DID studies can convincingly address parallel trend and spillover concerns, mainly
because it is much harder to address such concerns in a DID setting with cohort variation. For
example, the typical placebo tests fails to show an effect if control cohorts are indeed affected
positively but in a similar way. In addition, many studies do not seriously consider migration
during times of conflict which could be a main driver of spillover effects.
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oil revenues account for a large part of the government’s fiscal budget, it has
traditionally been a very important region for policymakers (Abazie-Humphrey,
2014; Obi, 2014). As Obi (2014) lays out, the government has taken over federal
control over oil in the 1960s and since then sharply decreased revenue derivation,
that is, the share flowing into regional budgets. This has created tensions in the
Niger Delta region and resistance activists have become a key actor since the late
1990s. In particular, the “Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta”
(MEND) has emerged and became violent from 2006, marking “an escalation from
uncoordinated protests and conflicts into a trans-Delta insurgency.” Their violent
activities were characterized by oil worker abductions, attacks of government
forces and oil installation sabotages which led to a conflict involving a rapid
decrease in oil production and increase in fatalities.7
By the time Umaru Yar’Adua got elected as president in April 2007, the
Niger Delta conflict has become a pressing issue for the government to solve
due to its dependency on oil revenues. He announced an amnesty program on
25 June 2009 and established the “Niger Delta Peace and Conflict Resolution
Committee” (NDPCRC) in July. The amnesty program targeted ex-militants
and granted “unconditional pardon to all persons who have directly participated
in the commission of offences associated with militant activities in the Niger
Delta” in return for surrendering their weapons, renouncing the use of violence
and taking part in a government-sponsored “Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reintegration” (DDR) program (Obi, 2014). In fact, the DDR program was a key
and hugely expensive element of the program.8 Ex-militants participating in the
program received a monthly stipend of 65,000 NGN (Nigerian Naira, approx. 440
USD in 2009), support and vocational training to facilitate their reintegration
into society. The amnesty program took effect on 6 August 2009 and militants
had a period of 60 days to sign up (The Guardian, 2009). 20,192 rebels signed
up during this period. However, further militants were still approved after the
deadline which accumulated the total number of participants to 30,000 after all
(Oluduro & Oluduro, 2012; Premium Times, 2012).
7In fact, as can be seen below, the number of reported fatalities drastically escalates only in
2009. From 2006 to 2008, therefore, the conflict seems to have manifested itself rather in great
uncertainty, pipeline explosions, and threat of terror.
8According to Abazie-Humphrey (2014) who refers to a press conference with Kingsley Kuku,
the chairman of the amnesty program, annual budgets for the program up until 2014 amounted
to more than 1.8 billion US dollar.
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The statistics on post-2009 fatalities show and analysts generally agree that
the program was effective in establishing peace in the region, at least for a cou-
ple of years (Abazie-Humphrey, 2014; Obi, 2014; Oluduro & Oluduro, 2012;
Oluwaniyi, 2011).9 Abazie-Humphrey (2014) argues that peace in the region
served as a condition for development and growth through a more stable business
environment and the completion of infrastructure project. In a simple analysis
comparing mean outcomes for the artisan fishing industry, Achoja et al. (2013)
find some suggestive evidence of an improved business situation. Therefore, it
seems worthwhile to exploit the amnesty program as a policy shock generating
peace to investigate its effect on a range of outcomes.
4.3 Theoretical Considerations
For each of the outcomes I consider, there are multiple channels how peace may
affect them. Since the direction of the effect is usually clear, I resort to a brief
verbal discussion of the possible mechanisms involved without a formal model.
After all, the empirical exercise is mainly about the quantification of these effects.
In addition, I focus on a discussion of the converse effect, namely the channels
how conflict affects my outcomes of interest, in order to stay in line with the vast
majority of the literature regarding and estimating the issue from this angle. The
effect of peace naturally operates in the opposite direction.
As for GDP or general economic performance, Collier (1999) provides an
overview of potential channels. Conflict leads to the destruction of resources,
physical and human capital as well as infrastructure, disruption of order, diver-
sion of public expenditure from output-enhancing activities, dissaving, increased
uncertainty and decreased foreign investment. From this macro perspective, such
effects should all lead to a reduction in economic performance. Conversely, peace
as a reversion of these effects should lead to increased economic performance,
especially in the medium and long run. However, related to the idea of a rapacity
effect as a cause of conflict (Dube & Vargas, 2013), if there is conflict over a valu-
9These authors are, however, sceptical as to whether the policy is able to generate lasting
peace. They generally criticize it for not addressing fundamental causes of the conflict in spite
of the government’s rhetoric viewing the policy as a pathway to sustainable peace. Indeed, some
increases in conflict can be observed in the region from 2015, but in light of the Boko Haram
insurgency affecting the whole country, it is difficult to causally link this to a failed amnesty
policy. In any case, my analysis focuses on outcomes in 2013 and the data shows a period of
peace between 2009 and 2013.
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able resource (which is the case with oil in the Niger Delta), rebels benefit from
resource theft and revenues. Therefore, for those households involved in conflict,
peace may mean a drop in their economic performance, at least in the short run.10
Nonetheless, it is plausible to expect the reversion of the above effects as peace
unfolds to operate on a larger scale, be relevant for all households and therefore
dominate potential immediate economic losses from resource theft in the medium
and long run.
The effect on self-employment activity or income is partly related to general
economic performance effects. The obvious link is that any changes in households’
income translate into demand changes. A demand reduction translates into con-
traction of businesses providing the goods demanded. Other than through this
link, conflict also directly affects self-employment. Destruction of infrastructure
and increased uncertainty mean higher cost of production.11 In the specific case
of conflict over a natural resource, engaging in militant activity and resource theft
also becomes an alternative supply of labor and some households may shift some
labor into this activity which also reduces labor supplied to self-employment ac-
tivity. Taken together, a contraction of self-employment businesses and higher
cost of operation should lead to a reduction in self-employment income. Con-
versely, peace operates in the opposite direction of these effects and should lead
to an increase in self-employment income.12
With regards to education, three channels are usually discussed in the liter-
ature. First, demand side factors may reduce the amount of schooling obtained
during conflict. If conflict reduces financial resources,an income effect would lead
to a reduction in (the consumption of) education since schooling is costly. Fur-
thermore, especially in the context of developing countries and poor communities,
if the reduction in financial resources pushes households below or close to the
subsistence level, a substitution between education and income-generating work
10This is reflected in the findings by Guidolin & La Ferrara (2007).
11Seiermann (2012) and Ksoll et al. (2016) provide specific examples. The former explores the
infrastructure channel explicitly in Peru. She argues that destroyed infrastructure, in particular
roads, leads to higher cost of market access for self-employed people who need to get to the
next market to sell their products. The latter consider flower exporters in Kenya during times
of electoral violence. They find that firms had to face increased labor absenteeism and pay
higher wages as a compensation for coming to work in times of conflict. Although they consider
(larger) firms, the mechanism is equivalent for self-employed businesses that employ labor.
12Self-employment activity may increase both on the intensive and extensive margin as a
response to peace which both lead to higher self-employment income. On the intensive margin,
business owners who invest more time and effort into their existing businesses generate more
income. On the extensive margin, more businesses being set up result in more competition and
crowding-out of the least productive businesses which would also result in higher income on
average.
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may kick in. Apart from this chosen education-labor substitution, involuntary
education-labor substitution also occurs in incidences of child soldiering through
forced recruiting or military draft. Second, supply side factors may reduce school-
ing. This includes the destruction of schools or conflict-related deaths of teachers.
Third, a general situation of increased uncertainty and insecurity means that it
is more dangerous to leave the house to attend public institutions.13 When peace
starts, the reversion of all these effects should lead to an increase in education.
4.4 Data
4.4.1 Data Sources
I use two different sources of data for this study. The first is the Nigerian General
Household Survey (GHS) with socio-economic data on Nigerian households. I use
survey rounds 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2012 (National Bureau of Statistics Nigeria,
2012). These surveys provide measures for the three outcomes considered: edu-
cation, self-employment income and household expenditures. The data collection
of GHS survey round in year y is actually carried out early in year y + 1, more
precisely, typically between February and July of the following year. Therefore,
the GHS rounds 2006, 2007 and 2008 with data on the first halves of 2007, 2008
and 2009 are used for the optimization procedure to create the synthetic control
region. This procedure creates a synthetic control region that closely corresponds
to the Niger Delta region in all outcome variables in 2009 and for a short pre-trend
of two years. Earlier rounds are not available. The GHS round 2012 provides
data on outcome variables in the first half of 2013 that is used to measure the
effects of the peace policy four years later.
Using data from 2013 seems to strike a good balance between capturing mean-
ingful medium-run consequences after peace has been established and not cap-
turing any other effects with the end of the amnesty program in 2015 and heavily
increased violent activities due to Boko Haram in some Nigerian states from
2014. The amnesty program established a period of peace in the Niger Delta re-
gion lasting at least four years, but it took a year for low levels of violent conflict
13Strictly speaking, this is a demand side factor as well but the focus here is on the substitution
effect towards other goods arising from an increase in the cost of education. By contrast, the first
channel focuses on the mere income effect from a reduction in financial resources. Therefore,
this is often considered to be a conceptually distinct channel.
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to materialize. Hence, using data from 2010 that would be alternatively available
is likely to be too early and would not capture the arguably more meaningful
medium-run outcomes. On the other hand, 2015 is the year when the amnesty
program ended, conflict increased to some extent again and some Nigerian states
were so badly affected by Boko Haram activities that they may not represent a
valid counterfactual any more. Therefore, alternatively available data from 2015
also seems inappropriate.
For measures of conflict, I make use of data provided by the Armed Conflict
Location & Event Data Project (ACLED, 2015). This is a very rich data source
covering all conflict events with precise location data in many developing states
from 1997. In particular, I use the data on Nigeria from 2006 to 2009 for the
optimization procedure. In addition, I use conflict data before 2006 and between
2010 and early 2013. The pre-2006 data is used to verify that the conflict devel-
opment is similar in the synthetic control and Niger-Delta region over a longer
time horizon before 2006. The post-2009 data is used to assess whether the syn-
thetic control method indeed produces a counterfactual that displays sustained
post-2009 high levels of conflict relative to the Niger Delta region in which conflict
goes down.
4.4.2 Relevant Measures
As a measure for conflict, I consider fatalities in a conflict event. In particu-
lar, I use the sum of fatalities in violent events in a particular state and year
as a measure of the degree of conflict. Following the definition of ACLED re-
garding political violence, I include the following event types: Battles (“Battle
– No change of territory”, “Battle – Non-state actor overtakes territory”, “Battle
– Government regains territory”), “Remote violence” and “Violence at civilians”.
The predominant reason for the inclusion of these events is that they involve
violence and variation in the number of fatalities. However, even if other event
types are included that are typically associated with no or very few fatalities (e.g.
“Strategic development”), the results do not change dramatically.
The main reason for using the sum of fatalities as opposed to other measures
of conflict is that it captures both the extent and intensity of conflict. As a
demonstrating example, consider the following two scenarios of conflict a state
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could undergo: Very few events involving enormous amounts of fatalities vs. an
extremely large amount of events with relatively few fatalities each. In my simple
categorization, the former is rare, but quite intense conflict while the latter means
extensive, but low-intensity conflict. It is unclear whether one scenario represents
more conflict than the other or not. Taking the average number of fatalities in
an event would, for example, capture only the intensity of conflict, but disregard
the extent and give the first scenario a much higher score. Taking the number
of incidents as a measure would, on the other hand, capture the extent, but
disregard the intensity and give the second scenario a much higher conflict rating.
Therefore, it seems reasonable to use the sum of fatalities as a measure in order
to capture both elements.
As an education measure, I use a standard measure: Years of schooling. This
is observed in great sample size at the state level.
In order to capture overall economic capacity or welfare, I use a measure of
household expenditures. Although this does not capture savings, I prefer this
measure over household income for several reasons. First, household income is
imprecisely measured. For the GHS 2008 survey, the monthly income is only
measured in 1000s of NGN (1000 NGN were approximately 6.80 USD in 2009)
which – although this seems to be a fairly small inaccuracy in absolute terms –
may have non-negligible implications given the fact that 25% of the population
report to have an income below 6000 NGN. For the 2012 survey, the income
question is on the last payment and not for a specific time period. In light of the
high irregularity of income flows that is common for many people in developing
countries, it is unclear how informative and accurate such a measure is. Second,
key quantiles in the distribution of monthly income and household expenditures
in the GHS 2008 survey that are used to create a synthetic control region to the
Niger Delta region are very similar. It does not seem to be the case that large
amounts of constant saving disguise the true welfare of household. Third, and
relatedly, household expenditures also capture the ability of households to smooth
out consumption. While income measures for the last month may be due to high
degrees of fluctuation, expenditures are much more smooth and provide a clearer
picture of the household’s economic welfare situation. Indeed, the distribution of
expenditures for the GHS 2008 survey looks considerably more smooth than the
one for income.
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As another measure of economic activity that may be an important driver
of changes in overall economic capacity or welfare, I consider self-employment
income on non-farm businesses. As is typical for many developing countries,
self-employment activity is of major importance in the economy. In 2012, 62%
of workers report being self-employed in a non-farm business while only 11% of
workers report working for someone else for a wage. Regarding income as a
measure as opposed to a mere measure of whether household members own a
business or not, this captures the extent of self-employment activity arguably
better. It reflects any additional time and effort going into one’s business as well
as success through a more conducive environment. In addition, it captures an
increase in the number of businesses indirectly since this would translate into more
competition, crowding-out of low-productivity businesses, and therefore higher
income on average.
In order to capture the average in a meaningful way for both household expen-
ditures and self-employment income, I use the median as opposed to the mean
for standard reasons.14 The mean is subject to high volatility for such mea-
sures coming from changes in the extreme top part of the distribution. This is
a potentially particularly severe issue in my context where I only have data on
monthly expenditures and self-employment income in the month preceding the
survey interview.
4.5 Empirical Design
4.5.1 The Synthetic Control Method
In order to get a valid counterfactual region that the Niger Delta region can be
compared to after the policy implementation, I use the same method as Abadie
& Gardeazabal (2003) for their investigation of the economic cost of conflict in
the Basque region, Spain, in the late 1960s. I construct a synthetic control region
from the states that are outside the Niger Delta region and thus unaffected by
the policy. There 28 states outside the Niger Delta region (denote the number of
non-Niger Delta states NNND = 28). The key idea is to use a weighted average
14While I observe expenditures at the household level, I observe self-employment income at
the enterprise level within a household. Most households have one (small) business but around
a third have more than one. I therefore consider median household expenditures and median
enterprise incomes for states.
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of these 28 states that is comparable to the (population weighted) average of the
nine Niger Delta states prior to the policy implementation. Since I investigate the
impact of the policy on education, household expenditures and self-employment
activity, it seems appropriate to make the synthetic control region comparable to
the Niger Delta region in these characteristics before the policy change. I use the
data on these outcome variables in all survey rounds up until 2009 for creating
the synthetic control region. As an additional characteristic to be similar between
the Niger Delta and synthetic control region, I consider conflict for the period
between 2006 and 2009.15
To introduce some notation for this procedure, let the matrix X capture the
four variables on which the synthetic control region is supposed to closely resem-
ble the Niger Delta region in all available time periods: 2007-2009 measures of
education, self-employment income and household expenditures and 2006-2009
measures of conflict. These are 13 variables for each of the 9 states in the Niger
Delta region (denote the number of Niger Delta states NND = 9), so X is of
dimension (13 × 9). Similarly, let the matrix Y of dimension (13 × 28) capture
the same measures for the 28 states outside of the Niger Delta region.16 Further-
more, let v be a (9 × 1) vector of population weights for the Niger Delta states
and w be a (28 × 1) vector of some weights for the non-Niger Delta states. For
the 13 characteristics considered and some vector of weights w, the difference
Xv− Y w captures the simple distance between the population weighted average
outcome in the Niger Delta region and a w weighted average of the non-Niger
Delta states. The goal of the synthetic control method is to minimize the squared
distance by choosing weights w, that is, the optimal weights arise as the solution








15This period is chosen because it captures the same time horizon as the GHS surveys and
because the MEND group, one of the largest militant groups in the Niger Delta, became violently
active in 2006 which marks a sharp increase in conflict before the amnesty program was started
in 2009.
16In order to guarantee comparability in the scale of the different measures, I actually use
constructed z scores of each measure by standardizing on the 28 non-Niger Delta control states.
However, the non-standardized values are reported for ease of interpretation.
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where ws denotes the weight on non-Niger Delta state s. The resulting optimal
vector w∗ has non-zero weights for only six of the 28 non-Niger Delta states
(denote the number of states in the synthetic control region NSC = 6): Abuja
(4%), Adamawa (20%), Anambra (12%), Borno (14%), Kogi (27%) and Lagos
(23%). The Niger Delta and synthetic control states are displayed in Figure
4.1.17
Figure 4.1: Niger Delta and Synthetic Control Region
Note – Niger Delta states are displayed in blue. Synthetic control
states are displayed in black.
The synthetic control region overcomes the substantial gap between the aver-
age of Niger Delta states and an average across all states outside the Niger Delta
region before the policy change. A simple comparison between these two regions
would be subject to selection bias and lead to overestimation of the effects since
the non-Niger Delta states perform systematically worse than the Niger Delta
states in all relevant characteristics. However, the synthetic control constructed
using the weights w∗ is comparable to the Niger Delta region. In addition, in
order to provide some confidence that w∗ actually provides a valid counterfactual
region, I check how it performs on some indicative socio-economic characteristics
relative to the Niger-Delta region that can be found in the GHS 2009 survey:
Average age, the share of own account workers among all working people as well
as the share of individuals with electricity supply, ownership of at least one TV
and ownership of at least one mobile phone. Table 4.1 provides the results for
17The shares are rounded to the nearest integer. All other states have a weight of zero
rounded to the nearest integer. It is not unusual that only a minority of potential control states
has a non-zero weight. Abadie & Gardeazabal (2003), Gong & Rao (2016) and Matta et al.
(2016) similarly get that only fewer than five control states or countries out of a considerably
larger set have non-zero weights. Four out of six states making up the synthetic control region
are indeed spatially close to the Niger Delta region. Section 4.7.2 deals with potential spillover
concerns.
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both the variables used in the optimization procedure and further characteristics.
Focusing on the period between 2007 and 2009, Figures 4.3, 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 dis-
play the results for the outcome variables graphically and Figure 4.2 shows the
results for further characteristics.
Table 4.1: Synthetic Control Creation Results
Niger Delta (ND) non-Niger Delta Synthetic Control
(p-value ∆ ND) (p-value ∆ ND)
Pre-Policy Outcomes
Fatalities 2006 2.9 3.2 (n/a) 6.7 (n/a)
Fatalities 2007 16.9 11.7 (n/a) 14.8 (n/a)
Fatalities 2008 16.2 4.4 (n/a) 14.5 (n/a)
Fatalities 2009 163.7 28.7 (n/a) 100.7 (n/a)
Years of Schooling 2007 7.68 6.88 (0.00) 7.89 (0.10)
Years of Schooling 2008 7.28 6.59 (0.00) 7.22 (0.56)
Years of Schooling 2009 7.60 6.85 (0.00) 7.54 (0.48)
Self-emp. Income 2007 72.65 65.52 (0.08) 68.30 (0.35)
Self-emp. Income 2008 107.60 90.32 (0.05) 101.11 (0.59)
Self-emp. Income 2009 94.81 62.98 (0.00) 86.67 (0.10)
HH Expenditures 2007 96.10 69.98 (0.00) 82.76 (0.01)
HH Expenditures 2008 154.61 123.95 (0.00) 166.76 (0.13)
HH Expenditures 2009 100.30 89.00 (0.00) 105.01 (0.08)
Further Characteristics (2009)
Age 26.0 22.7 (0.00) 24.5 (0.00)
Own Account Workers (%) 71.9 66.1 (0.00) 66.1 (0.00)
Electricity Supply (%) 72.8 50.7 (0.00) 58.6 (0.00)
TV Ownership (%) 19.5 12.0 (0.00) 16.5 (0.00)
Mobile Phone Owner (%) 44.6 29.8 (0.00) 40.6 (0.00)
Note – Both self-employment income and household expenditures are reported in USD. p-values for mean
differences with the Niger Delta region are based on two-sided t tests with min{NND, NNND} − 1 = 8
d.o.f. for the difference between Niger Delta and non-Niger Delta states and min{NND, NSC} − 1 = 5
d.o.f. for the difference between Niger Delta and Synthetic Control. Since the measure for conflict is
aggregate data on the universe of conflict, typical standard errors are not available.
As the graphs show clearly, the conflict trend between 2006 and 2009 as well
as the developments for education, self-employment income and household expen-
ditures in the Niger Delta region are well matched by the synthetic control region.
While there are considerable differences between all non-Niger Delta states and
the Niger Delta region, the synthetic control region closes this gap.18 All but
18It also becomes clear that there is no linear or uni-directional trend for education, self-
employment income and household expenditures. There are several important developments
that may be reasons for the patterns observed: General elections in 2007, a sharp food price hike
in 2008 and the financial crisis in 2008. Multiple channels are conceivable. Sharply increasing
food prices from 2007 to 2008 (UNFAO, 2009) may have increased expenditures mechanically,
but may also have resulted in substitution away from children’s education towards income-
generating activity through lower income. The crisis may have hit Nigeria throughout 2008
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Figure 4.2: Synthetic Control Creation Results for Further Characteristics






















Note – Characteristics are age in years and shares of individuals who are own account
workers (among all working people), have electricity supply, own TVs and own mobile
phones. All data is from 2009.
one difference are statistically indistinguishable at the 5% level and the magni-
tudes of differences are usually not very sizeable. As for further characteristics
for which the distance between the Niger Delta and synthetic control region is
not minimized in the process of the optimization, the synthetic control region
still manages to substantially close the gap between the Niger Delta region and
the simple average of all non-Niger Delta states for most variables.19 Lastly, it is
notable that the pre-2006 conflict trend in the Niger Delta region (which is not
part of the optimization) is more closely followed by the synthetic control region
than by the trend in all non-Niger Delta states.
and resulted in worse economic performance in 2009, in particular in the Niger Delta region
suffering from oil price drops (CBN, 2009). The new president’s policy may have had its own
effect on education and economic performance. Irrespective of what combination of key events
or developments may explain these patterns, however, what matters for identification is that
the synthetic control region closely corresponds to the Niger Delta region in this trend. This
seems to be the case.
19It is indeed true that for all characteristics, the difference between the Niger Delta region
and the synthetic control region is still statistically highly significant. However, this is due
to the fact that there is a very large number of observations at the individual level for these
characteristics and averages are therefore extremely precisely estimated – even small differences,
consider for example mean age, would show up statistically highly significant. However, they
are not necessarily economically meaningful.
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4.5.2 Interpretation and Identification
This analysis takes the unusual approach of evaluating peace in the Niger Delta
region relative to continued conflict in other Nigerian states serving as counter-
factual. Most studies conversely evaluate either ongoing conflict relative to peace
or the consequences of a period of conflict some time after the conflict has ended
(with greatly varying time horizons) by comparing areas that were affected by
conflict to counterfactual areas that did not experience conflict in the past. I eval-
uate peace relative to continued conflict because the amnesty policy in the Niger
Delta region and conflict in other Nigerian states after 2009 provide a unique
(quasi-experimental) setting for this estimation.
Conflict in the period between 2009 and early 2013, especially the later part of
this period, happens in a number of Nigerian states mainly – but not exclusively
– in the northeastern part of the country.20 In this sense, the results I find
can also be interpreted as the contemporaneous impact of continued conflict in
some parts of the Nigeria (represented by the synthetic control region) relative
to peace in a comparable Niger Delta region. However, I prefer to interpret
them conversely as the benefits of peace in the Niger Delta region relative to
what would have happened counterfactually in the same region had the policy
not been implemented. This is essentially an estimate of a peace dividend, an
evaluation of the potential damage the amnesty policy prevented.
The estimate may even be a lower bound of the true peace dividend since
the counterfactual displays (only) sustained levels of conflict which are very com-
parable to the ones in 2009. It is not clear whether conflict levels would have
been sustained or further escalated in the absence of the amnesty policy. Given
long underlying tensions and violent conflict that sparked shortly before 2009, it
may be reasonable to think that an escalation of conflict would provide a more
realistic counterfactual.
The key identifying assumption for the estimation of the peace dividend is that
the Niger Delta region would have had the same development as the synthetic
control region after 2009 in the absence of the amnesty policy. Relatedly, one
may wonder why an amnesty policy was carried out as a response to conflict
20For example, the state Borno lies in this part of Nigeria and is one of the states making up
the synthetic control region. Conflict in Borno is partly driven by Boko Haram’s activities in
that region.
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in the Niger Delta region and not in other states of Nigeria that experienced
ongoing conflict and – more importantly – whether the underlying reasons pose
a threat to identification. Clearly, the fact that the Niger Delta region is an oil
rich region and that the oil production is a main determinant of the government’s
fiscal resources plays a role. However, I argue that this is not a concern for bias
and internal validity and, if anything, affects external validity.
First of all, any relevant influence of systematic differences in oil production
between the Niger Delta region and the synthetic control region should show up in
differences in the pre-2009 trend which actually closely resemble each other. Fur-
thermore, oil production decreased in the Niger Delta region before 2009 (Abazie-
Humphrey, 2014; OPEC, 2010). Any concern (in the sense of an omitted variable)
around oil production picking up before 2009 when the policy happened to be
put in place with the implication that observed effects would be confounded with
positive effects of already increasing oil production before 2009 is inconsistent
with such a decrease. Much to the contrary, it seems likely that the policy was
put in place precisely because of massive losses from decreased oil production due
to conflict. However, this means that the effects of peace (partly) operate through
increased oil production after 2009 which is not a source of endogeneity but just
a channel through which peace operates.21 Therefore, my results just provide a
reduced-form effect of peace from all possible channels.
Naturally, the Niger Delta’s oil richness implies that we may expect peace to
generate particularly large benefits in the region. This is an issue of external valid-
ity, related to the idea of “site selection” in randomized controlled trials (Allcott,
2015). As a consequence, and as usual, my results should first and foremost be
interpreted as the effect generated in the specific context of conflict in the Niger
Delta region. To assess to what extent external validity may be compromised, it
is then instructive to regard them in light of findings from different settings.
Another identification concern is that the synthetic control method is generally
unable to distinguish the effect of the analyzed policy from the potential effect of
other policies or developments over the same time horizon in the same area. In
this case, the peace effects cannot be isolated from any other political or economic
21Note that the synthetic counterfactual displays sustained levels of conflict reflecting a coun-
terfactually sustained low oil production. Again, if anything, it seems reasonable to assume that
conflict may actually have escalated further and induced further drops in fiscal revenues from
oil production, in which case the results are lower bounds.
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development between 2009 and 2013 that affects the Niger Delta region. One such
rather prominent development is the election of President Goodluck Jonathan in
2010 who comes from the Niger Delta region. Given Nigeria’s clientelistic nature
of government, it is not far-fetched to believe that his policies may have benefited
the Niger Delta region relative to other parts of the country in the outcomes
of interest. While I cannot perfectly exclude any such effects, considering the
outcomes in the state Bayelsa that Goodluck Jonathan is from separately from the
entire Niger Delta region suggests that this is not a major concern. For all three
outcomes, Bayelsa exhibits a lower value in 2013 than the average of the Niger
Delta region and the difference is substantial. Furthermore, the development over
time in Bayelsa is not better than for the other states of the Niger Delta region.
Indeed, while it is comparable for education, it is actually considerably worse for
self-employment income and household expenditures.
4.5.3 Differences with Other Approaches
Comparing the synthetic control method to standard regression techniques (in-
volving in particular DID regression methods that are commonly used in the
micro-empirical literature on the effects of conflict), three distinct advantages
of the former method emerge. First, while it can be shown that a regression-
based estimator would essentially also produce a weighted average of potential
control states with the weights summing up to one, the weights may lie outside
the unit interval (Abadie et al., 2015). Therefore, regression techniques allow for
extrapolation and hence potential extrapolation problems whereby the extent of
extrapolation is typically unknown to the empirical analyst since the weights are
usually not computed in practice.
Second, and especially relevant to this multi-outcome analysis, a regression-
based analysis would not produce the same counterfactual for all the outcomes
while the synthetic control method does and successfully matches not only 2009
outcomes, but also the pre-trend. This may yield more convincing estimates of
the causal effects of peace.
Third, the commonly used DID techniques do not allow to control for time-
varying fixed effects in different regions while the synthetic control method does.22
22While it is possible to control specifically for potentially confounding observable variables
(past realizations of outcome variables could for example be controlled for) and hence capture
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Abadie et al. (2010) prove that the synthetic control method is essentially a gen-
eralization of the usual DID model in precisely the way that it allows unobserved
characteristics to vary with time.23 The key common trend assumption in DID
analyses which basically assumes away that unobserved characteristics in treat-
ment and control units are time-varying can actually be verified in my data.
Since my data allows me to observe how the treatment and control states evolve
with regards to the outcomes of interest in the two years preceding the policy
implementation in 2009, it can actually be observed how the common trend fails
between 2008 and 2009 for self-employment income and household expenditures.
The reduction in the former variable is considerably more pronounced in the non-
Niger Delta states. It amounts to 27.34 USD in non-Niger Delta states while it
is only 12.79 USD in Niger Delta states. Household expenditures show the re-
verse pattern; they decrease more strongly in Niger Delta states (by 54.31 USD
vs. a 34.95 USD reduction in non-Niger Delta states). A close look at the trend
in Figures 4.5 and 4.6 between 2008 and 2009 identifies this differential pattern
graphically. In fact, implementing a simple DID procedure as a robustness check
in section 4.7.1, I show that the DID results deviate from the results coming out




While the sharp conflict trend was stopped and reversed in the Niger Delta region
as a consequence of the policy from 2010, the synthetic control region continues
to show high conflict levels after the policy implementation. Figure 4.3 depicts
this relationship very clearly. The synthetic control region maintains high conflict
levels relative to both the Niger Delta region and the non-Niger Delta states after
their time-varying effects within regions, this does not solve the problem entirely. First of all,
there may still be unobserved characteristics that vary in time. In fact, including past outcome
variables in the DID regressions that I carried out as robustness checks does not change the
results substantially. In addition, this still imposes a linear relationship between the observed
control variables that are included while the synthetic control method does not make such a
parametric assumption. Finally, including past outcome variables as control variables engenders
the standard problem of putting the assumption of no correlation between the error term and
regressors at risk since any degree of autocorrelation in the error term would result in a violation
of the assumption.
23The idea is essentially that the synthetic control method is likely to match time-varying
unobserved heterogeneity when it matches a sufficient number of observable characteristics.
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the amnesty policy implementation in 2009. Although there is a sharp drop in
the synthetic control region in 2010, conflict levels are high again and comparable
to the 2009 Niger Delta levels from 2011 to 2013. It is particularly relevant for
the peace dividend estimation that conflict levels are very similar in the synthetic
control in early 2013 and in the Niger Delta region in 2009 since the estimation
is based on outcomes in early 2013. By contrast, the average across all states
outside the Niger Delta region does not correspond to these conflict levels.24
Figure 4.3: Conflict Levels Before and After 2009
























Note – In 2009, the peace policy was implemented. For 2013, only January to July
are included as the data collection for outcome variables in 2013 ended in July.
The following analysis estimates the benefits of post-2009 peace in the Niger
Delta region. The time series does not conclusively prove but strongly suggest
that the amnesty policy played a role in generating peace in the region. There-
fore, I interpret the peace dividend as the result of the amnesty policy. This
interpretation ceases to hold up if the amnesty policy does not cause peace in the
region. Importantly, however, for the estimation of the peace dividend (irrespec-
tive of how peace came about), documenting a period of peace between 2009 and
24Table A7 shows these results formally in a regression. Focusing on the violent period
immediately preceding the policy from 2006, I consider both how the fatalities change on average
(column 1) and how the trend in violence changes (column 2). There is both a significant
reduction in fatalities in the Niger Delta region after 2009 and also a significant trend break
with violence increasing up until 2009 and decreasing after.
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2013 is sufficient.
4.6.2 Main Results on Economic Outcomes
Comparing the Niger Delta region to its synthetic control region in early 2013, the
effect of peace in the Niger Delta region on education, self-employment income
and household expenditures is considered in this section. Table 4.2 and Figures
4.4 to 4.6 summarize the main findings.
Table 4.2: Main Results for the Synthetic Control Method (SCM)
Years of Schooling Self-emp. Income HH Expenditures
Niger Delta 8.56 118.25 193.47
(0.08) (11.54) (5.40)
Synthetic Control 8.06 70.75 162.49
(0.10) (5.80) (4.97)
SCM Estimator 0.50∗∗∗ 47.49∗∗ 30.98∗∗∗
(0.12) (12.91) (7.34)
Note – Self-employment income and household expenditures are reported in USD. Standard
deviations/errors are reported in parentheses. Standard deviations for median self-employment
income and median household expenditures are bootstrapped with 500 replications at the state
level. On the basis of one-sided t tests with min{NND, NSC} − 1 = 5 d.o.f., ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Figure 4.4: Education Results


















Note – Vertical bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
The results represent a peace dividend over a period of four years. All results
are statistically significant at the 5% level at least. The substantial magnitude
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Figure 4.5: Self-employment Income Results































Note – Vertical bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
of the results suggests that there are considerable benefits from peace or, con-
versely, severe consequences of conflict. Average education increases by 0.5 years
of schooling which is broadly in line with what the literature finds in other coun-
tries. Typical estimates range between a reduction by 0.2 and 1 year(s) of school-
ing.25 According to estimates by Aromolaran (2006) and Schultz (2004), returns
to primary and secondary schooling in Nigeria range between 2% and 7% and are
even higher for post-secondary education (10%-15.5%).26 Given these estimates,
even if we were to ignore the potentially overestimated returns for post-secondary
education which only about 10% of the Nigerian population enjoyed in 2013, an
average increase by half a year of schooling has a meaningful long-term economic
effect on the labor market.
With regards to both measures for economic activity, I find substantial effects.
In the Niger Delta region, self-employment income is 47.49 USD higher than in
the synthetic control region at the median and household expenditures exceed its
counterfactual by 30.98 USD at the median. The relative effects are enormous.
25This is based on the comprehensive set of studies cited in the introduction.
26Even though these authors merely run OLS regressions on household survey data, they
argue that the potential upward bias from omitted socio-economic factors may very well be
offset by downward bias from measurement error, referring to Card (1999) and Ashenfelter &
Krueger (1994). In particular for primary and secondary education, the quality of education
measurements in the household surveys would suggest that this is quite likely to be the case
or that the bias from measurement error may even be larger in which case, if anything, their
return estimates provide lower bounds.
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Figure 4.6: Household Expenditures Results





























Note – Vertical bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
Given the counterfactual median values, these differences represent 67% and 19%
increases, respectively.
Since the initial levels for both variables are not exactly the same for the
Niger Delta and synthetic control region in 2009, one might be concerned about
bias of the estimator. However, even if we take the initial differences in 2009
into account and subtract them from the outcome difference in 2013, we would
still have sizeable effects. For self-employment income, the effect would be 39.35
USD (or 56%) and it would amount to an increase by 35.69 USD (or 22%) for
household expenditures.27
In relation to the existing literature, the results on household expenditures
are indeed large but in line with what the most closely comparable literature
finds. Studies that exploit the synthetic control method to estimate the effect of
conflict on economic performance a couple of years following its onset generally
find effects ranging between -5% and -20% (Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2003; Dorsett,
2013; Gong & Rao, 2016; Matta et al., 2016).
Going beyond an estimation of the peace dividend for a measure of households’
overall livelihood, my results for self-employment income shed light on an impor-
tant driving force behind these benefits of peace. The activity of (small) busi-
27Using the information in Table 4.1 and 4.2, 39.35 = 47.49 − (94.81 − 86.67) and 35.69 =
30.98− (100.3− 105.01).
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nesses seems to be revitalized. With 62% of workers engaged in self-employment,
this is an important economic activity. Yet, the mechanism has been largely
overlooked so far. There is one comparable study in Mexico that considers how
self-employment income is affected by violent conflict (Velásquez, 2020). She
finds considerably smaller effects. However, this is not necessarily surprising as
the Niger Delta region is a setting in which we may expect to find large economic
benefits for businesses. In the oil-rich region, peace may lead to a quick and strong
rebound of business activity in the oil industry and spin-off businesses. Indeed,
Walls & During (2020) find that oil production increases by 40% in response to
the peace policy in the Niger Delta region. Beyond the oil industry itself, oil
and any derivative materials may be key inputs for many other businesses that
make use of generators or cars. Therefore, it is entirely plausible that peace has a
strong effect on productivity of businesses which translates into increased income.
With regards to the theoretical considerations, the results are in line with what
peace is expected to generate. In particular, the effect on household expenditure,
taken as a measure of overall economic performance, is strongly positive. Clearly,
the medium-run benefits of peace significantly dominate any potential immediate
economic losses from diminished militant activity and oil theft. We also observe
that the increase in self-employment income are relatively larger than the increase
in overall economic performance which may reflect that some labor supply shift
from military activity and oil theft into non-farm business activity has indeed
taken place. Of course, alternative explanations may be that not all additional
income is spent, but part of it is saved, or that self-employment activity has
increased relatively more strongly than waged labor supply as a response to peace.
4.7 Robustness
4.7.1 Difference-in-differences Estimation
As a first robustness check, I perform a simple difference-in-differences (DID)
analysis as an alternative method for the outcomes education, self-employment
income and household expenditures. The simple comparison is essentially just a
comparison of two differences in means. In regression format, the DID estimator
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would be the coefficient δ in:
yit = α + βNDi + γT2013t + δ(NDi × T2013t) + uit
where yit and uit are the outcome and error term in state i and year t respectively,
NDi is a dummy variable indicating whether state i is in the Niger Delta region
or not and T2013t is a dummy taking the value 1 if the year is 2013.28
I can demonstrate that the DID results are in line with my previous results
for outcomes for which the parallel trend assumption holds and deviate from the
results in the expected direction for outcomes for which the pre-2009 trend for
the non-Niger Delta states deviates from the Niger Delta and synthetic control
region. Table 4.3 presents the results in the format of simple two-way differences.
Table 4.3: Difference-in-differences Estimation (DID) Results
Years of Schooling Self-emp. Income HH Expenditures
2009 2013 2009 2013 2009 2013
Niger Delta 7.60 8.56 94.81 118.25 100.30 193.47
(0.04) (0.08) (2.37) (11.54) (1.58) (5.40)
non-Niger Delta 6.85 7.21 62.98 50.17 89.00 140.00
(0.03) (0.05) (0.86) (4.08) (0.64) (2.78)
DID Estimator 0.59∗∗∗ 36.24∗∗ 42.17∗∗∗
(0.10) (12.49) (6.30)
SCM Estimator 0.50∗∗∗ 47.49∗∗ 30.98∗∗∗
(0.12) (12.91) (7.34)
Pre-trend Deviation 0 + -
Note – Self-employment income and household expenditures are reported in USD. Pre-trend De-
viation is a DID estimator for outcomes between 2008 and 2009. Standard deviations/errors
are reported in parentheses. Standard deviations for median self-employment income and me-
dian household expenditures are bootstrapped with 500 replications at the state level. On the
basis of one-sided t tests with min{NND, NNND} − 1 = 8 d.o.f. for the DID estimator and
min{NND, NSC} − 1 = 5 d.o.f. for the SCM estimator, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Comparing them with the results from the synthetic counterfactual procedure,
it should first of all be noted that the two estimators are not significantly different
for any of the three outcome variables (the lowest p-value on the three difference
tests is 0.24 – for median household expenditures). As for education, the differ-
ence between the two estimators is very small. This is consistent with the fact
28Most DID approaches are finer in the sense that they control for regional fixed effects by
taking a dummy variable for each region instead of a coarser distinction between Niger Delta
states and non-Niger Delta states only. However, which set of dummies is used does not make
a difference for the magnitude of the DID estimator δ. Furthermore, if past values of the
outcome variables are included as additional controls, the results do not change much. The
simple version of the DID is therefore reported here.
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that the parallel trend assumption strongly appears to be satisfied. Graphically,
Figure 4.4 demonstrates this clearly.
With regards to self-employment income and household expenditures, how-
ever, the fact that the two estimators are statistically indistinguishable may not
necessarily be a result of the two estimators in fact coinciding, but of large stan-
dard errors. Nevertheless, considering the point estimates, the direction of the
DID estimator’s deviation is perfectly in line with pre-trend differences between
the Niger Delta states and those outside the Niger Delta region. Figures 4.5 and
4.6 demonstrate this point graphically. It seems that the two regions follow a
similar trend between 2007 and 2008 and have different trends between 2008 and
2009 – as discussed in section 4.5.1, the magnitude of these trend deviations is not
negligible. Therefore, the direction of the common trend assumption’s violation
can be well captured by a simple DID estimation between 2009 and 2008. As for
median self-employment income, this trend deviation is positive. Therefore, we
would expect the DID estimator to underestimate. In the case of median house-
hold expenditures, the trend deviation is negative and we would expect the DID
estimator to overestimate.29 Relative to the estimator using the synthetic coun-
terfactual, these are exactly the bias directions that we observe.30 This should
place further confidence in the main results based on the synthetic counterfactual.
4.7.2 Spillover Effects
Since four of the six states that are part of the synthetic control region are quite
close to the Niger Delta region, one might be concerned about spillover effects.
Any effect of peace in the Niger Delta region on states outside it would form a
violation of the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA) and bias the
results. There are potential spillover effects in two directions that would bias the
results in opposite ways.
First, there may be spillover effects from peace on other states that would
form a positive impact on them, for example through increased trade with neigh-
29As for education, this way of estimating a pre-trend deviation gives a precisely estimated
zero. The estimate is 0.05 (p = 0.46).
30With regards to the magnitude of bias, the standard errors are very large which makes it
impossible to make precise statements as to whether the magnitude of the bias reflects the actual
difference observed between the two different estimators. Indeed, the point estimates are close
and statistically indistinguishable in both cases. For median self-employment income, the esti-
mator difference is 11.25 and the trend deviation is 14.55; for median household expenditures,
the estimator difference is -11.17 and the trend deviation is -19.36.
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boring states if economic activity improves in the Niger Delta region or through
infrastructure extending into neighboring states. Such effects would imply that
states outside the Niger Delta region are also “treated” and their outcomes would
show up more positively than the true counterfactual. Therefore, these effects
go against my results and would mean that I underestimate with the true effect
being even larger than what I find.
Second, posing more reason for concern, peace may attract people from other
states into the Niger Delta region. In this case, outcomes of states outside the
Niger Delta region would show up more negatively than the true counterfactual
and I would overestimate the true effect. Typically, and plausibly, these effects
would be stronger for states that are closer to the treatment region which is what
I exploit to test for spillover effects.
As a first piece of evidence against the presence (or dominance of) one type of
spillovers, consider the above DID results again. The particular spillover concern
with the synthetic control region is that four out of the six states that in it are
very close to the Niger Delta region. The DID approach, however, takes all 28
non-Niger Delta states as part of the counterfactual. Since spillovers are expected
to be stronger in states closer to the treatment region, with sizeable spillovers we
would expect the DID results to be systematically different from the main results
using the synthetic control region. This is not the case. The DID results are
not only statistically indistinguishable from the SCM results but the former also
deviate from the latter in different directions across the outcomes self-employment
income and household expenditures. They do not jointly indicate the presence
or dominance of one type of spillover. Much rather, as discussed above, these
differences can be explained by pre-trend deviations.
Migration flows, taken from the GHS 2012 survey, serve as a second piece
of evidence against the presence (or dominance of) one type of spillovers. The
particular spillover concern in terms of migration flows is that there may be a
large inflow of (especially highly economically contributing) people into the Niger
Delta region from the synthetic control region relative to the opposite flow in
times of peace or that peace generally attracts in-migration. In this case, states
closer to the Niger Delta region should show more migration into that region than
states further away. Table 4.4 demonstrates that both these concerns do not seem
to apply.
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Table 4.4: Migration Flows
Move from SC Move from NS Move from NND Move from ND
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
Move to SC 2.18%
(0.0023)
Move to NS 0.89%
(0.0014)
Move to NND 8.99% 12.45% 7.75% 3.05%
(0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0006) (0.0027)
Move to ND 0.28% 0.40% 0.45% 13.02%
(0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0006) (0.0027)
Total Migration 11.05% 12.84% 8.20% 16.06%
(0.0041) (0.0043) (0.0018) (0.0045)
Note – SC: Synthetic Control region; NS: States directly neighboring the Niger Delta region; NND:
non-Niger Delta states; ND: Niger Delta region.
In fact, the migration flow of people from synthetic control states into the
Niger Delta region is very small in absolute terms and considerably (as well as
statistically significantly) lower than the opposite migration flow.31 In addition,
both the migration flow from states directly neighboring the Niger Delta region
(NS)32 and from the synthetic control region into the Niger Delta region are very
close to the general migration flow from non-Niger Delta states into the Niger
Delta region.33 Therefore, the data do not suggest that the migration flow from
states that are closer to the Niger Delta region is over-representative of the general
migration flow into the Niger Delta region which is what we would expect to see
if the second type of spillover effects was at play.
4.8 Conclusion
This study investigates the benefits of peace for education, self-employment in-
come and household expenditures in the Niger Delta region in Nigeria. For the
estimation, I make use of the “Presidential Amnesty Program” carried out by the
31The same result holds when comparing the share of migrants from the synthetic control
region who move into the Niger Delta region and vice versa. Using the information in the table,
the share of out-migrants from the synthetic control region moving into the Niger Delta region
is 0.28/11.05 = 2.1% while the share of out-migrants from the Niger Delta region moving into
the synthetic control region is 2.18/16.06 = 13.6%.
32These eight states have a common border with at least one of the Niger Delta states and
are thus defined to be the neighboring states: Anambra, Benue, Ebonyi, Ekiti, Enugu, Kogi,
Ogun, Osun.
33If anything, the flow from SC or NS into ND is smaller than the flow from NND into ND but
the estimates are statistically indistinguishable. Again, similar results arise when comparing
shares of migrants.
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Nigerian government in the region in 2009. The program granted ex-militants
pardon as well as money and required them to undergo “Disarmament, Demo-
bilization and Reintegration” in return for surrendering their weapons. It can
be viewed as a policy shock and it was followed by a period of regional peace
for a few years. This provides a unique setting to estimate a peace dividend by
comparing the Niger Delta region to a synthetic within-country counterfactual in
the spirit of Abadie & Gardeazabal (2003). The synthetic control region closely
resembles the Niger Delta region before 2009 and the estimation results are robust
to several checks.
I find that peace in the Niger Delta region resulted in a 19% increase in
household expenditures at the median four years later. A key component of this
improvement in household livelihoods seems to be revitalized self-employment
activity. Over the same time horizon, self-employment income increased by 67%
at the median. Education increases by half a year. Beyond being a desirable
outcome itself, the education increase also suggests that there are likely positive
peace benefits for school-aged people on the labor market in the long run.
The results are to be interpreted as the peace dividend generated by the
amnesty policy in the Niger Delta region relative to a counterfactual of sustained
conflict in the region. Although suffering from a considerable degree of uncer-
tainty around the point estimates, they may even provide a lower bound to the
true effects of peace if we assume (not unrealistically) that violent conflict in the
Niger Delta region would not have remained constant, but further escalated in
the absence of the amnesty program. The large effects are relevant in Nigeria’s
current context of continuous violent activities by Boko Haram. They suggest
that there are important economic benefits to be reaped from finding a way to
sustained peace.
The estimates give us an idea of how large and varied the effects of peace –
or conversely, conflict – potentially are for different outcomes of economic impor-
tance and provoke two exciting questions for further research. First, what are
the consequences of conflict for different elements of economic activity beyond
general economic performance? Given the extraordinarily large effect I find for
self-employment income and the fact that there is only little research exploring
this link, it seems worthwhile trying to dissect effects on overall economic perfor-
mance into its various components. In addition, the strong results deserve fur-
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ther research to try and understand precisely why business activity is so strongly
linked to conflict and such an important driver of the overall economic effects of
it. Second, do these large effects persist long into the future or do affected re-
gions or countries converge back to their non-conflict counterfactual eventually?
Although there is some literature exploring effects in the long run, the results are
inconclusive. More research employing a broad array of methods including the
synthetic control approach that identify both the overall effects and mechanisms
in the long run seems necessary to find an answer to this question.
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Table A2: Further Results: Education
Years of Schooling Primary Education
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Conflict -1.083∗ -0.149 -0.113∗∗ -0.0235
(0.572) (0.407) (0.0501) (0.0333)
N 18690 2656 18691 2656
R2 0.321 0.299 0.295 0.293
Estimation Method IV IV IV IV
First Stage F (KP) 24.31 14.16 24.31 14.16
AR p-value 0.058 0.710 0.026 0.466
Sample Young Old Young Old
Socio-econ. Controls X X X X
District FE X X X X
Note – Outcome variables: Years of schooling (columns 1 and 2) and indicator
for having finished primary school (columns 3 and 4). Samples: ‘Old’ are all
individuals born before 1961, ‘Young’ are all individuals born after 1961.
Conflict standardized and instrumented with distance to border. For the
old sample, conflict is measured in birth chiefdom; for the young sample, it
is measured in chiefdom of residence in 2018. Clustered standard errors at
the chiefdom level in parentheses. Kleibergen-Paap cluster-robust F statistic
and p-value for weak instrument robust Anderson-Rubin test of H0 : β = 0


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A3: Robustness: Exclusion of Chiefdoms with Direct Border
Log household expenditures per worker
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Conflict -0.0840∗∗ -0.0979∗∗∗ -0.338∗∗ -0.514∗∗∗
(0.0348) (0.0361) (0.132) (0.189)
N 13586 13586 13586 13586
R2 0.358 0.369 0.321 0.280
Estimation Method OLS OLS IV IV
First Stage F (KP) 20.80 14.03
AR p-value 0.008 0.001
Socio-econ. Controls X X X X
Land Controls X X
District FE X X X X
Note – The sample is restricted to chiefdoms that do not have a direct border
with Liberia. This excludes 10 chiefdoms from the analysis. Outcome variables:
Log total expenditures per worker. Conflict standardized and instrumented
with distance to border. Clustered standard errors at the chiefdom level in
parentheses. Kleibergen-Paap cluster-robust F statistic and p-value for weak
instrument robust Anderson-Rubin test of H0 : β = 0 reported. Stars refer to
standard t-tests. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 [Back to main]
Table A4: Robustness: Household Expenditures
Log household expenditures
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Conflict -0.0573∗∗ -0.0670∗∗ -0.168∗∗ -0.286∗∗
(0.0259) (0.0278) (0.0810) (0.113)
N 21158 21158 21158 21158
R2 0.450 0.459 0.440 0.421
Estimation Method OLS OLS IV IV
First Stage F (KP) 23.40 15.28
AR p-value 0.039 0.002
Socio-econ. Controls X X X X
Land Controls X X
District FE X X X X
Note – Outcome variable: Log total household expenditures. Conflict stan-
dardized and instrumented with distance to border. Clustered standard errors
at the chiefdom level in parentheses. Kleibergen-Paap cluster-robust F statis-
tic and p-value for weak instrument robust Anderson-Rubin test of H0 : β = 0
reported. Stars refer to standard t-tests. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
[Back to main]
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Table A5: Robustness: Expenditures per Adult Equivalent
Log expenditures per adult equivalent
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Conflict -0.0597∗∗ -0.0688∗∗ -0.175∗∗ -0.286∗∗
(0.0258) (0.0279) (0.0819) (0.112)
N 21158 21158 21158 21158
R2 0.415 0.424 0.402 0.384
Estimation Method OLS OLS IV IV
First Stage F (KP) 23.40 15.28
AR p-value 0.035 0.002
Socio-econ. Controls X X X X
Land Controls X X
District FE X X X X
Note – Outcome variable: Log total expenditures per adult equivalent. Con-
flict standardized and instrumented with distance to border. Clustered stan-
dard errors at the chiefdom level in parentheses. Kleibergen-Paap cluster-
robust F statistic and p-value for weak instrument robust Anderson-Rubin
test of H0 : β = 0 reported. Stars refer to standard t-tests. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A7: Conflict Reduction in the Niger Delta Region
(1) (2)
Fatalities Fatalities










Note – Outcome variable: Fatalities in a vio-
lent conflict event involving at least five fatalities.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in paren-




Figure B1: Map of Sierra Leone in West Africa
Note – Freetown is the capital of Sierra Leone. Source: Open Street Map. [Back to
main]
Figure B2: ISIC Sector Classification
Note – From information on the ISIC section of their main professional
activity, workers are classified to work in one of the three sectors accord-
ing to the above figure. [Back to main]
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Figure B3: First Stage Within Districts
Note – The conflict measure is standardized and distance is measured in km.
The straight line presents an OLS line of best fit. [Back to main]
Figure B4: Sector Shift





















Note – IV coefficients depicted for specification with socio-economic controls, district
fixed effects and minimum distance to large cities controlled for. 95% confidence
intervals based on clustered standard errors at the chiefdom level. [Back to main]
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Figure B5: Distribution of Labor Unit Wage Rates
Note – Histograms of observed log income in the data lnmSecd and estimated
log labor unit wage rates lnwSd by sector. [Back to main]
Figure B6: Distribution of Firm-level Productivities
Note – Histograms of log firm-level productivities by sector. [Back to main]
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Figure B7: Distribution of Average Individual Productivities
Note – Histograms of log average individual productivities by education level.
[Back to main]
Figure B8: Distribution of Amenities
Note – Histograms of log amenities. [Back to main]
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Figure B9: Parameter Changes
Note – Distributions of log origin populations of individuals with primary school education
lnN1, log non-agricultural firm productivities lnASd and log average individual productivities
among the uneducated ln q0c. The black histogram displays the original distributions and
the red histogram displays the counterfactual distributions. [Back to main]
Figure B10: Aggregate Income Changes by Chiefdom
Note – Absolute value of aggregate income reductions (in %) in each
chiefdom as a result of the civil war relative to a no-war scenario. Full
conflict simulation considered. Estimates stem from model simulation.
Missing data: 5 chiefdoms unobserved in households survey 2018; 3 chief-
doms without conflict information. [Back to main]
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Note – Aggregate income changes for different values of the elasticity of substitution σ.
[Back to main]



















Note – Changes in the economy-wide size of the agricultural sector for different values of
the elasticity of substitution σ. [Back to main]
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C Proofs
Proof of equation 3.8. Recall that individual productivity draws zSid for des-











Consider the indirect utility distribution of workers choosing destination d
and sector S, that is, the distribution of V Sid := V Sid |i ∈ MSecd = maxd′,S′{V S
′
id′ }.















































































The probability that someone chooses d and sector S is
πSecd = Pr
[
V Sid > V
S′





























































where the last step makes use of the decomposition of qSecd = qecεSecd into an
origin-education average and remaining variation.

































































An introduction of trade cost in the classic iceberg format would have an impli-
cation for the estimation of ASd in step 3 of the estimation (section 3.3.3). Denote
the iceberg trade cost by ηSdg ≥ 1 as the amount of good produced in d that would
need to be bought in any other location g to consume one unit of that good in g.























Market access is the weighted sum of real GDP in all buying locations of a good
that is produced in d or f where the weights are the inverse trade cost. With trade
cost, therefore, my estimates of firm productivities ASd are in fact a composite of
firm productivities and market access. Section 3.5.3 discusses the implications
for the results in counterfactual simulations and the estimation of the aggregate
effects of civil war.
D.2 Endogenous Education
As a simple extension of the model with endogenous education choice, consider the
individual productivity shock that workers draw to be sector-, destination-, and
education-specific. Workers draw the shock zSied for each sector S, destination d,
and education level e from independent Fréchet distributions with scale parameter
qSecd. Denote the origin-specific cost of getting education level e by kec satisfying
k0c = 1 and k1c > 1. It is assumed to enter as a denominator in your income.








Workers maximise utility to choose their education level, sector and desti-
nation. Similar considerations as before give that the probability of choosing




V Sied > V
S′


















As a result, education choice can be described by the ratio of the probability










In this setting, the effect of conflict on education operates through an effect
on the cost of education. The destruction of schools and killings of teachers in
origin c make it more costly for individuals born there to get educated, that is, k1c
increases. Clearly, fewer people will get educated as a result. The implications of
this and conflict effects on firm productivities and location amenities for sector
and destination choice are the same as in the original model.
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E Numerical Solution Algorithm
All simulations described in section 3.5 require model solutions. Given param-
eter values {θ, φN − φA, AAd , ANd , ad, q0c, exp(φN)q1c, τA0cd, τN0cd, τA1cd, τN1cd, N0c, N1c},
the model solution is numerically found using the following recursive procedure.






Step 2. In iteration i, given origin populations Nec and the movement matrices,
the workforce in each sector and destination can be computed.
Step 3. Given the workforce in each sector and destination, labor supply is


















Note that this object can be identified even without separate identification
of φS and qec since the two only enter multiplicatively. For the uneducated,
q0c is known. For the educated in non-agriculture, exp(φN)q1c is known. For
the educated in agriculture, exp(φA)q1c = exp(φN)q1c × exp(φA − φN) can be
computed using the known parameter values above.
Step 4. Given labor supply LdS and firm productivities ASd in each sector and
destination, wage rates can be determined up to scale. Using the estimated non-
agricultural wage rate in Freetown wNFreetown as a normalization, all other wage












∀S ∈ {A,N} ∀d ∈ K (E2)
Step 5. Given wage rates wSd , compute vSecd and find the optimal sector and




















Step 6. Update your guess of movement matrices as a convex combination




























sufficiently small for all movement matrices.
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